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Aiding and Altruism

INTRODUCTION

Confucius' aphorism about the relative values of pictures
and words is a testament to the persuasive power of an image.
Since the mid-1960s, one image, the image evoked by the Kitty
Genovese incident, has shaped the debate about the legal duty
to rescue. Ms. Genovese was brutally murdered on a Queens,
New York street while thirty-seven neighbors, who watched
and listened in safety, did nothing.' Not one of those thirtyseven intervened; not one even called the police.2 Granted,
since the Genovese slaying, those neighbors probably have
lived with their own private demons or rationalizations, but
the impression of humanity left by this tragic image of inaction is rather dim. The Genovese story may leave one feeling
isolated, lonely, and, perhaps, even afraid.
Does the Genovese image of inaction reveal some inevitable
human trait? Perhaps not. During the 1992 Los Angeles riots,
four African-Americans rescued a white truck driver, Reginald
Denny, who lay beaten in the street.3 Their intervention saved
Denny's life.4 What made those people help Denny? Why did
thirty-seven people in New York do nothing while four people
in Los Angeles acted? Generally, what motivates people to aid
others? What can law, particularly tort law, do about it all?
What should it do?
Anglo-American law long has held, with a few exceptions, that
one has no affirmative duty to help another in peril.5 The rule's
basic thrust is to absolve the non-actor from legal responsibility
for the consequences of his inaction. Commentators have long
decried the rule as immoral.' Some have called for its abandonment;' others have shrugged their shoulders and justified it on

1.
Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call Police, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1964, at 1; Charles Mohr, Apathy Is Puzzle in Queens Killing, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1964, at 21.
2.
A 38th person phoned the police after Genovese was dead. See Gansberg,
supra note 1, at 1.
3.
White DriverPulled From Mob; 4 Black Strangers Guide Man in 18-Wheeler
to Safety, WASH. POST, May 1, 1992, at A32.
4.
Id.
5.
See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
6.
See infra notes 159, 476 and accompanying text.
7.
See infra Part IV.A.
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practical grounds.8 Still others have defended the rule in the
name of individual rights.9
Some modern studies of tort law have focused on economic
efficiency.1" Alternatively, Professor Epstein has developed a
moral theory of strict liability based upon principles of
causation. His theory is libertarian, highlighting the individual's
general right to do as she pleases, up to the point where that
action causes injury to another. I Underlying both the economic
theories of tort law and Epstein's theory of strict liability is the
behavioral notion that people act out of egoistic, enlightened
self-interest. Self-interested people will not rescue another
unless the personal benefit derived from acting outweighs the
anticipated costs of rescue.
A rule that imposes no duty to act is consistent with Epstein's
theory. From Epstein's libertarian perspective, as long as a
person does not cause injury to another, he should remain free
to choose what he will or will not do.12 To hold otherwise
undermines the freedom and value of the individual. 3 If the
self-interested actor chooses to help, so be it, but society and
the law should not require action.
From the economic perspective, perhaps society could impose
a duty to act when the benefits of rescue to the rescuer outweighed the costs of acting. This result could be achieved
through some system of penalties or rewards. 4 The economically
efficient rule would rely on the underlying assumption that
action could be triggered either by threatening the individual
with a sanction for failing to act or by promising a reward for
rescuing. Either way, the rule would be designed to induce
helping behavior by appealing to the self-interest of the
potential actor. Both Epstein and the legal economists seem to
rely heavily on the psychological model of the self-interested
actor.

8.
9.

See infra Part IV.D.
See infra Part IV.B.

10.
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw (1987).

11.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY (1980).
12.
See infra notes 468-69 and accompanying text.
13.
See infra notes 474-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 428-44 and accompanying text. See Saul Levmore, Waiting
14.
ForRescue:An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law ofAffirmative
Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986).
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But is the self-interested actor model really appropriate
when talking about helping another? The duty to help, protect,
or rescue another involves compassionate behavior, human
action that is often not necessarily in the actor's self-interest.
It is altruistic behavior. Yet the concepts of compassion and
altruism are discussed rarely in judicial opinions.
In contradistinction to the economic theories of tort law and
Epstein's model, feminist scholars call for a more empathic
view of tort law.' 5 But how does empathy relate to the legal
duty to act? How does empathy fit with altruism?
The human mind may hold some answers. Why, psychologically, do people help or not help? Are our current laws in this
area consistent with scientific and psychological explanations
of the way people think and act? Are the generally accepted
notions of human behavior upon which we have based our
laws accurate? Are they accurate in this context?
The world's mythologies and literatures are full of stories
praising compassion and altruistic action. The paradigmatic
Christian story of altruistic action is Christ's tale of the good
Samaritan."6 But Christians have no monopoly on stories about
altruism. The concept of the Buddhist boddhisattva, who pauses
on the brink of the void beyond all knowing before turning back
to bring all creatures to enlightenment, connotes compassion.' 7
Mystical states whereby a person might experience a wholeness
or oneness of being may be viewed, in part, as the breakdown
of ego boundaries leading to the sensation of universal
compassion.'" The philosopher Schopenhauer used the metaphor
of rescue as the model of compassionate behavior, thereby
attempting to explain the mystical feeling of oneness.' 9 Thus,
both mythology and literature have painted a picture of aiding
action that is not limited by the self-interest of the potential
actor.
Recent psychological studies have confirmed this mythological model of the human as, at least partially, a compassionate

See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,
15.
Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848 (challenging the "blame
the victim" critique of tort law and calling for a tort system grounded in "care,
response, and interdependency").
16.
See infra Part II.B.1.
17.
See infra Part II.B.2.
18.
See infra Part II.B.3.
19.
See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
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being.2" Most notably, studies undertaken by Dr. C. Daniel
Batson 21 indicate that one's motivation to aid another is not
always self-interest; often it is altruistic. Batson defines a
motivation to primarily benefit one's self as egoistic and a
motivation to primarily benefit another as altruistic. 22 Not
only has Batson shown that people do act to help others out of
altruistic motives, but he also has established a connection
between feeling empathy for another and subsequent altruistic
action. 23 Batson's studies undercut the foundations of the noduty-to-act rule. They confirm my own notion that the general
no-duty-to-act rule merits reconsideration.
Critically, reasonable people in fact may act to help others,
not just out of self-interest, but to improve another's condition.
People may be, at least in part, altruistic by nature. Therefore,
tort law-which has long sanctified the icon of the reasonable
person-would do no violence to that concept if it imposed
duties to rescue in situations where compassionate, aiding
action might be expected. In fact, one may conclude that by
not considering all the psychological explanations for behavior,
tort law actually is undermining its traditional reliance on the
reasonable person standard to define negligence. Of course,
the trick is to identify those situations where reasonable
people would act altruistically.
To base legal rules-particularly the no-duty-to-act rule-on
a psychological model that says people act only out of selfinterest is to adopt what turns out to be an unrealistically
narrow perspective of human capacity for altruistic action.
That perspective and the resulting no-duty-to-act rule minimize our potential for compassionate behavior. They fail to
recognize compassion as an integral aspect of our psychological
persona, and in this failure, they unrealistically narrow the
legal and societal field of vision.
This Article asserts that traditional tort law should be
modified to provide for a duty to act in situations in which a
reasonable person would act altruistically. Part I examines

20.
In contrast to the recent studies discussed in the text, Freudian models of
behavior posit that one's motivation for acting is self-interest. See infra note 355 and
accompanying text. Freud's egoistic model is consistent with most biological theories
for action, including Darwinian theories of evolution. See infra notes 356-58 and
accompanying text.
21.
See infra Part III.C.3.
22.
See infra notes 363-68 and accompanying text.
23.
See infra notes 388-91 and accompanying text.
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traditional and more recent tort doctrine governing the duty
to aid. Part II discusses compassion from philosophical, literary, and mythological points of view and explores how these
viewpoints inform compassion's possible relationship to a legal
duty to help. Part III considers the connections between
psychological theories and studies of action, altruism, and
empathy. In addition to Batson's work, I reexamine the classic
studies of Latan6 and Darley and the application of their
conclusions to the debate about the duty to help. I then analyze legal theorists' discussions of a duty to help in light of the
psychological evidence, concluding that while some proposals
for modifying the traditional rule are consistent with the
psychological evidence, both scholars and courts need to
consider more factors than they have so far. Most notably,
Latand and Darley's work, showing that a group of bystanders
who know each other are more likely to act than an individual
bystander, suggests that courts should consider the number of
bystanders present and their relationship to one another.2 4
Batson's work further suggests that tort law should consider
the extent to which an actor under a particular set of circumstances could be expected to feel empathy for another.2 5
Finally, Part IV urges judges and other lawmakers who shape
tort rules regarding action to open their eyes to the human
capacity for compassionate action. Courts slavishly tied to a
model of behavior based on egoistic, self-interested motivations
reinforce that model, while Batson's work reveals the limitations
of that model given the prevalence of empathically-induced
altruistic action. Courts and other policy makers should recognize altruistic action not only as possible and desirable but, in
fact, reasonable. In deciding cases and writing laws they must
focus on those factors psychologists have determined are most
likely to influence a person to help others.
I ultimately conclude that tort law ought to impose a duty
to act, but only when action is reasonable under the circumstances. This is standard tort law: there is a duty to act
when a reasonable person would act. But in making that decision, courts and juries should look at all relevant factors,
including the psychological evidence that humans have the
innate ability to act altruistically. To state the duty positively
is to recognize our capacity for compassion, whereas the

24.
25.

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.D.4.a.
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current rule highlights our egoistic limitations and our isolation from one another. Restatement of the rule and consideration of the psychological evidence are significant shifts
both practically and symbolically.

I. THE LEGAL RULES
A. No Duty to Act

Anglo-American tort law generally provides that a person is
under no duty to help another avoid injury from a foreseeable
risk, even if helping would entail little or no risk or cost. 26 The
no-duty-to-act rule has sometimes been restated in terms of
the different legal effects of nonfeasance and misfeasance. In
these terms, the rule provides that an actor is liable for
negligent misfeasance, but not for negligent nonfeasance.
Historically, a rule which imposed no liability for nonfeasance helped maintain the boundary between tort and
contract law. If enforceable in tort, a mere promise to act
without consideration sufficient to support a contract arguably
would have undermined a substantial portion of contract law.28

26.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER AND KEETON]. Professor Leonard refers to this general no-duty-to-act rule
as one of a number of per se no-duty rules. David P. Leonard, The Good Samaritan
Rule As a ProceduralControlDevice: Is It Worth Saving?, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807,
829 (1986). Per se negligence rules purport to foster predictability and save
administrative expense by allowing courts to determine duty "based upon a narrowly
prescribed set of circumstances defined in isolation of the facts of particular cases."
Id. at 822. Professor Leonard proposes replacing the per se no-duty rule with a
multifactor approach to determining duty. Id. at 853-68. He considers relevant: (1)
foreseeability of harm; (2) closeness of the causal link between the failure to rescue
and the injury; (3) ease with which the rescue could have been accomplished; (4)
identifiability of the defendant as a potential rescuer; (5) moral blameworthiness of
the non-rescuer's conduct; (6) similarity of the case to those invoking a traditionally
recognized approach; (7) degree to which imposing a duty will further the social policy
of preventing future harm; and (8) consequences for the community of imposing a
duty in this case. Id. at 863-64.
27.
Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort,
(pts. 1-3) 44 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 209, 273, 337 (1905); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, The
Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 251-58 (1980).
28.
See Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y 1809) (holding that no action in
contract would lie for breach of a promise to obtain insurance on cargo subsequently
lost at sea because there was no consideration, and no action in tort would lie
because the promise was not a sufficient undertaking); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v.
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At common law a promise had to be supported by consideration.2 9 Recovery for nonfeasance would have eroded this
doctrine. With the advent of promissory estoppel as a contract
theory of recovery, 30 however, the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance has lost some of its historical
justification. Now promissory estoppel itself provides at least
some legal redress for breach of promises not supported by
consideration. Moreover, some recent courts have found a
mere promise as the basis for a claim of misfeasance. 3 '
The common law no-duty-to-act rule, however, did more than
simply reinforce the tort-contract boundary. Courts also
applied the no-duty-to-act rule in cases where traditional
contract doctrine faced no threat. For instance, in Union
Pacific Railway v. Cappier,32 young Ezelle Cappier was run
over by the defendant's railroad car. One of Cappier's arms
and one of his legs were cut off.33 His mother sued and a jury
returned a verdict in her favor. 4 No contract values were at
stake in Cappier's suit against the railroad-as far as contract
law was concerned the parties to the action were strangers.
The jury found that the railroad's employees did not go to
Ezelle's aid as fast as they could have, although the employees
did actually render aid. 35 The Supreme Court of Kansas
reversed. Rather than hold that the jury had erred in its fact
finding and that the defendant had exercised reasonable
care, 31 the court went directly to the general duty question. Its
language is a paradigm for future judicial callousness:

Thorn, 258 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Mich. 1977) (adopting the modern rule that a lessor is
liable in tort for injury caused by lessor's breach of a covenant to repair).
29.

See generally JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 139-95 (2d rev.

ed. 1974).
30.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).

31.
See cases cited in PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, § 56, at 379-81.
32.
72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903).
33.
Id. at 281.
34.
Id. at 282.
35.
Id.
36.
The evidence established that the servant in charge of switching operations
had yelled a warning to the boy. Id. After the train hit Ezelle the servant stopped it
so that Ezelle could be pulled clear of the tracks. Id. Thereafter, the servant moved
the car ahead because he feared another train was coming. Id. The servant then
informed the general yardmaster of the accident and an ambulance was summoned.
Id. Other employees of the railroad actually undertook to stop Ezelle's bleeding before
the ambulance arrived. Id. Thus, it would seem that the railroad did take some action
on Ezelle's behalf, and that the real question before the court was whether the
railroad exercised reasonable care in fulfilling the duty it had assumed.
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With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It is the omission or negligent discharge of legal
duties only which come within the sphere of judicial cognizance. For withholding relief from the suffering, for
failure to respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for
faltering in the bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not in the laws of men, but
in that higher law, the violation of which is condemned by
the voice of conscience, whose sentence of punishment for
the recreant act is swift and sure.
The message is clear. Although the non-actor may find punishment in the next life, his victim has no legal recourse in
this one. Whatever fire and brimstone one faces for not acting
does not come from tort law.
Another gruesome and oft-cited case is Buch v. Amory
Manufacturing Co.38 Buch's thirteen-year-old brother was an
employee in the mule spinning room of the defendant's mill. 39
Without authority, the brother invited eight-year-old Buch,
who could neither speak nor understand English, into the
room to learn his brother's work.4" Young Buch's hand became
caught in gearing which employees were supposed to
avoid-no one had warned Buch of the gear's danger. After
finding that Buch was a trespasser,4 1 the court considered
whether, assuming Buch could not be adequately warned
about the machinery, the defendant had a duty to eject him
forcibly. The court began:
With purely moral obligations the law does not deal. For
example, the priest and Levite who passed by on the other
side were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering of the man who fell among thieves, which
they might, and morally ought to have, prevented or
relieved. Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a
two year old babe on the track, and a car approaching. He
can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to himself,

37.
Id.
38.
44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898), overruled in part by Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d
631 (N.H. 1976) (premising land owner's liability on foreseeability of injury rather
than solely on plaintiffs status as trespasser, invitee, or licensee).
39.
Buch, 44 A. at 809.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
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and the instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he
does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless
savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the child's injury, or indictable under the statute
for its death.4 2
Following this logic, the court predictably concluded that the
mill owner owed Buch no duty.4 3
Since these seminal statements rejecting good Samaritanism
were first written, there have been repeated calls to modify
the no-duty-to-act rule,4 4 yet it still stands. 45 Against this
backdrop of the ruggedly individualistic 46 no-duty-to-act rule,
several exceptions have developed that require action to help
others.

B. Special Relationships Between the Non-Actor
and the Victim

The common law imposes a duty to aid wherever a special
47
relationship exists between the potential actor and the victim.

42.
Id. at 810.
43.
Id. at 811.
44.
See generally THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (James M. Ratcliffe ed.,
1966) [hereinafter THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW]; Mark K. Osbeck, Note, Bad
Samaritanism and the Duty to Render Aid: A Proposal, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 315
(1985) (proposing a duty to notify the authorities of the victim's plight, but not a duty
to personally rescue).
45.
See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988)
(reversing appellate court's exception to the general rule that non-therapist
counselors are liable for negligent failure to prevent suicide), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1007 (1989); see also Penton v. Clarkson, 633 So. 2d 918 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that a woman who shared an apartment with a man she had been dating for about
two years had no duty to act to prevent his suicide following an argument that had
lasted several hours and in which the decedent had threatened the defendant, despite
the fact that on prior occasions the decedent had both threatened and attempted
suicide).
46.
The historian Frederick Jackson Turner believed that the principal trait of
the American character was a rugged individualism, which had been shaped by the
frontier experience and the existence of the frontier itself. FREDERICK J. TURNER, THE
FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30, 37, 271-73 (1920); see also Francis H. Bohlen,
The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (pt. 1), 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217, 219-20 (1908) (stating that the "fundamental" distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance is based on an "attitude of extreme individualism').
47.
See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, § 56 at 376-77; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A-B (1965). These special relationships "include relationships
of intimacy and relationships in which the party upon whom the duty is imposed gains
economic benefits from the association." Osbeck, supra note 44, at 322.
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Even in the early days of the common law, those who undertook
a public calling were obligated to protect their customers.4 s
Accordingly, tort law has long imposed an obligation on common
carriers to aid their passengers, 49 and on innkeepers to rescue
their guests.5"
Modern tort law also imposes a duty to act on employers and
other "caretakers."5 ' The master of a vessel must rescue a sailor
in his charge who falls overboard at sea,52 and a jailer must aid
a prisoner.5 3 Similarly, a teacher has an obligation to exercise
reasonable care to protect her students.5 4

48.
See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, § 56, at 373.
49.
See, e.g., Yu v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 144 A.2d 56, 58 (Conn. 1958);
Gladdish v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 169 S.W.2d 297,299 (Ky. 1943); Frederick
v. City of Detroit, 121 N.W.2d 918 (Mich. 1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314A(1) (1965); see also Korn v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 133 S.E.2d 616 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1963) (finding duty breached where bus driver knew of passenger's handicap,
failed to warn her about step outside bus terminal, and failed to get medical assistance
after passenger was injured); Continental S. Lines, Inc. v. Robertson, 133 So. 2d 543
(Miss. 1961) (finding bus company liable where passenger was injured on bus and
notified driver, but driver failed to get medical attention at next stop); sources cited
in FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., 3 THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 722 n.21 (2d ed. 1986);
cf. Gilstrap v. Amtrak, 998 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1993) (enforcing an 80-year-old
Washington State precedent that a common carrier's special relationship to its
passengers justifies strict vicarious liability for assaults by an employee).
50.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(2) (1965). This obligation may even
include protecting a guest from the criminal conduct of a third person. For instance,
in Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214, 227 (5th Cir. 1984), the court found a hotel
liable for the murder of a man on its doorstep because the hotel had failed to provide
adequate security. Id. at 227.
51.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) provides that one who takes
control of another, under circumstances that deprive the charge of his "normal power
of self-protection," has an obligation to protect the charge from third persons if the
custodian knows or should know that she has the ability to control the third person
and knows or should know of the opportunity to exercise that power to control. See
id. cmt. b (1965); McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362 (Wash.
1953) (citing § 320 of the Restatement in holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action
against school district for breach of duty arising out of her forcible rape during recess
at school).
52.
Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931); see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders,Good Samaritansand OtherRescuers:
An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (discussing from
an economic perspective incentives to rescue lives at sea).
53.
Thomas v. Williams, 124 S.E.2d 409, 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962); cf. Iglesias v.
Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (duty not to release incapacitated
prisoners); Farmer v. State, 79 So. 2d 528 (Miss. 1955) (duty to provide medical
treatment); sources cited in PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, § 56 at n.38.
54.
Board of Educ. v. Chaddock, 398 S.E.2d 120, 123 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that
a "teacher has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect students from those injuries
which can be reasonably anticipated," but finding that duty not breached). But see
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (finding no special relationship
between university and student during a university-sponsored field trip).
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1. Family Relationships, Owners and Occupiers of Land,
and Social Hosts and Guests-Family relationships may also
impose an obligation to act. The duties of parents to their
children5 5 and of spouses to each other are fairly clear. 56 Less
clear is whether a child has a similar obligation to his
parent.5 7
In some circumstances, courts have found a special, dutytriggering relationship between owners and occupiers of land5"
and between social hosts and their guests. 59 In this vein,
courts have imposed duties on servers of alcohol, both for
business and social purposes, to protect minors who are
served ° as well as persons injured by those served.6 1
One older case may go even further in imposing a duty to
act on a landowner-host. In Depue v. Flateau,6 2 Depue, a cattle
buyer, stopped at Flateau's farm to inspect some cattle.6 3
Flateau invited Depue to stay for supper, but denied Depue's
request to let him spend the night. After dinner, Depue was

55.

See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS

414 (8th ed. 1988).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965).
56.
See Marhoefer v. Nacozy, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no
57.
special relationship between adult son and mother, but holding that adult son owed
parent the care of a reasonable son).
See, e.g., Doe v. Dominion Bank of Wash., 963 F.2d 1.552 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
58.
(landlord and commercial tenant); Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439
F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (landlord and tenant); Potter v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 615 So. 2d 318 (La. 1993) (finding the issue of whether a landlord has a duty
to maintain adequate exterior lighting that may have prevented plaintiffs rape by
a third person to be a jury question); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 224
N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975) (landlord and tenant); cf. L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40
N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1942) (finding that store owner has a duty to child whose fingers
were stuck in escalator to stop the escalator to prevent aggravation of initial
injuries). But see Craig v. A.A.R. Realty Corp., 576 A.2d 688 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989)
(finding mall owner not liable for rape of sublessee because non-possessory owner did
not exercise control equal to actual management of the mall).
59.
See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). Although Rowland
is discussed most frequently as the leading case rejecting the common law emphasis
on the plaintiffs categorization as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee to define the
extent of an owner or occupier's duty, it was essentially a case where the court
recognized a social host's duty to act to avoid harm to a guest.
60.
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Sovereign Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 626 So. 2d 880 (La.
Ct. App. 1993) (owners of liquor store liable); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha
Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971) (hosts of fraternity party liable);
Hansen v. Friend, 824 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1992) (friend who supplied minor with liquor
liable). See generally PROSSER ET AL., supra note 55, at 327-28.
See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984) (holding host liable
61.
where guest was visibly intoxicated).
111 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907).
62.
63.
Id.
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overcome by an illness which rendered him unable to care for
himself. The Flateaus led Depue out to his wagon, put the
reins over his shoulders, and wished him bon voyage.64 Depue
was found the following morning almost frozen to death in a
snow bank. 5 Depue later lost several fingers and otherwise
suffered ill health due to the misadventure. In contending that
they had no duty to provide Depue accommodations on that illfated night, or to otherwise exercise due care on his behalf,66
6 7 The
the Flateaus cited Union Pacific Railway v. Cappier.

Depue court, noting that Cappiermay state the rule as applied
to the good Samaritan, did not think it was applicable to the
case before it, stating:
The facts of this case bring it within the more comprehensive principle that whenever a person is placed in
such a position with regard to another that it is obvious
that, if he does not use due care in his own conduct, he
will cause injury to that person, the duty at once arises to
exercise care commensurate with the situation in which he
thus finds himself, and with which he is confronted, to
avoid such danger; and a negligent failure to perform the
duty 68
renders him liable for the consequences of his neglect.

In Depue, the court reasoned that the invitation to dinner
triggered a duty to act. Although no contractual duty required
the Flateaus to do anything, "humanity demanded that they
"
do so. 69
Two interesting points may be noted about the Depue decision.
First, note the court's reference to, and reliance on, "humanity,"
a concept that the courts in Cappierand Buch were comfortable
preaching,7" but which they completely ignored as a basis for
rendering their decisions. Second, the Depue court viewed the
duty to act arising out of the host-guest relationship not as an
exception to the rule that a person has no duty to act, but rather

64.
Id. at 2.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903). See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
68.
Depue, 111 N.W. at 2.
69.
Id. at 3.
70.
Cappier,72 P. at 282; see supranote 37 and accompanying text; Buch v. Amory
Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1897); see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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as a part of the more comprehensive rule that one has a duty
to exercise due care whenever injury is foreseeable. The general
duty to act reasonably in the light of foreseeable risk trumped
the more specific no-duty-to-act rule. Imposition of a particular
duty to act on an owner or occupier of land in light of the
general duty to act reasonably also is apparent in two cases in
which neither plaintiff was a social guest.
1 Villanueva
In the first of those cases, Soldano v. O'Daniels,7
threatened Soldano while they were at Happy Jack's Saloon. 2
Another patron went across the street to an inn, owned by
O'Daniels, and asked the bartender to either call the police, or
allow him to call the police.7 3 The employee refused both
requests. Back at Happy Jack's, Villanueva shot and killed
Soldano, whose son filed a wrongful death action against
O'Daniels.7 4 O'Daniels contended that he owed no duty to
Soldano.7 5 The appellate court disagreed. Expressly refusing
to find a special relationship, the court said that the individualistic attitude prevalent in no-duty-to-act cases merited
reexamination. 76 The court considered all relevant factors
pointing to a duty to act, including the problem with crime in
society, the key role of the phone system in preventing crime,
the foreseeability of the injury, the bartender's disregard for
human life, the deterrent effect of liability, the presence of
insurance, and the minimal burden that would have been
imposed had the defendant allowed the good Samaritan to use
the phone. 7 Although the court noted that it would be
impractical to require that a person open her home to allow a
stranger to use the telephone to report an emergency, the
court distinguished a business from a private home and
imposed a duty on the business owner to allow emergency
telephone access in the public portion of the business.7 8 The

190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
71.
72.
Id. at 312.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 311.
75.
Id. at 313.
76.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 315-16.
77.
78.
Id. at 316. The court analogized to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 327
(1965), which imposes a duty upon a third person not to prevent assistance to an injured
person. 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316. But see Andrews v. Wells, 251 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that a bartender and his employer had no duty to act on an inebriated
customer's request to arrange transportation home for him, where the customer died
after being hit by a car as he crossed a street leaving the defendant's bar).
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case thus presented sufficient factual issues to go to a jury.7 9
In another case, Ploof v. Putnam,0 a sudden storm forced a
family to moor their boat to a dock owned by the defendant."1
The defendant's servant untied the vessel which, along with
its contents, was destroyed by the storm." The family members
suffered personal injury and sued, alleging trespass and
violation of a duty to allow the plaintiffs to moor at the dock
and remain there until the storm passed.8 3 Ploof is often
treated as a necessity case. 84 Underlying the necessity holding, however, is an implicit holding that a land owner may
have a duty to act reasonably to aid the victim of an
emergency.
The Vermont Supreme Court found that mooring the vessel
at the dock was necessary under the circumstances.8 5 Although
necessity is a defense to an action for trespass,8 6 in Ploof the
court used necessity for another purpose: to impose a duty on
the defendant to open his land to the plaintiffs. In essence, the
necessity of the situation imposed an obligation on the
defendant to be a good Samaritan.
2. Joint Adventurers-Another relationship which may
trigger a duty to act is that between joint adventurers. In
Farwell v. Keaton,8 7 two teenage boys followed two girls to a
drive-in restaurant, only to be chased from the restaurant by
the girls' friends.8 8 One of the boys, Siegrist, escaped, but the
other, Farwell, was caught and beaten.8 9 Siegrist put ice on
Farwell's head and drove him around for a few hours while
Farwell slept in the back seat of the car. ° Finally, Siegrist

79.
Soldano, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
80.
71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
81.
Id. at 188.
82.
Id. at 188-89.
83.
Id.
84.
The defendant in Ploof did not argue that the plaintiff had no right to
trespass. Instead he argued first that there was no necessity because there may have
been natural objects to which the plaintiff could have moored instead of defendant's
dock, and secondly that his servant was acting outside the scope of employment in
unmooring the plaintiffs' vessel. Id. at 189-90. On necessity in general and on Ploof
in particular, see John P. Finan & John Ritson, Tortious Necessity; The Privileged
Defense, 26 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1992).
85.
Id. at 189.
86.
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, § 24, at 147; see also cases cited in
Ploof, 71 A. at 189.
87.
240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
88.
Id. at 219.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
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parked the car at Farwell's grandparents' house and left.9
Farwell died from his injuries three days later. 92 Farwell's
father sued Siegrist, contending that Siegrist should have
taken Farwell to the hospital or otherwise notified someone of
Farwell's condition.9 3 The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed
a $15,000 verdict in the father's favor. 94 A plurality found that
the two boys were "companions engaged in a common undertaking."9 5 As joint adventurers, they had a special relationship
to one another that triggered a duty to aid.96
A different court reached a similar conclusion in Ocatillo
West Joint Venture v. Superior Court.9 7 After Easley convinced
employees at a golf course to give him the keys to his intoxicated friend's car, and assured them that he would drive his
friend home, Easley gave the intoxicated man his keys.9" The
intoxicated driver had an accident and died from his injuries. 99
The appellate court found that sections 323 and 324 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts' ° suggested that Easley might
have assumed a duty to his intoxicated friend.''
3. Doctor-PatientRelationship:Duty to Disclose-In several
cases, ° 2 courts have held that doctors owe a patient a duty to
reveal the results of a medical examination, even if there is no
contractual relationship between the doctor and the patient.
The typical scenario involves a preemployment physical
examination in which the doctor fails to discover or disclose
some adverse health condition. Later, when the patient
discovers the now advanced condition, he sues the doctor or
employer. Courts have recognized the doctor's and employer's
duty to disclose what10 3the physical examination reasonably
should have revealed.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 222.
95.
Id.
96.
97.
844 P.2d 653 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
98.
Id. at 654.
99.
Id.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324 (1965) (imposing duty of
reasonable care on one who protects or takes charge of one who is helpless or in need
of assistance).
101. Ocatillo West, 844 P.2d at 655-57.
102. See, e.g., Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366 (Cal. 1972); Dornak
v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981); McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 584
N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
103. See supra note 102.
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Professor Shapo believes that there ought to be a duty to act
whenever one person has power over another so that the first
person knows that the other's "physical security is effectively
in his hands .... [Plower gives control, which in turn confers
duty, the breach of which is conventionally described as
negligence." 10 4 Shapo's rationale applies to physical exam cases,
because the doctor has power over the patient because she
possesses information concerning the patient's health.' 5
The special relationships that I have discussed are by no
means exhaustive. The number of special relationships that
courts may recognize seems limited only by a lawyer's ingenuity
and a court's willingness to reinterpret traditional rules. Some
special relationships, like that between an owner or occupier
of land and someone on the land, 0 6 indicate a general willingness to expand the exceptions to the traditional no-duty-to-act
rule.

C. A Special RelationshipBetween the Non-Actor
and the Perpetratorof the Wrong

Consistent with the general rule that one has no duty to aid
another who is lying helpless, one has no general duty to
prevent a person from injuring another. 7 Where a bystander

104. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER & PUBLIC POLICY
8 (1977).
105. This power analysis also applies to a Louisiana case involving the discovery
of the identity of a manufacturer. In Devore v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 367 So. 2d 836 (La.
1979), the plaintiff sued the owner of a boiler that had injured her for providing her
with the wrong name of the boiler's manufacturer. Id. at 837. By the time she had
learned the identity of the true manufacturer, her claimwas barred by the prescriptive
period. Id. Nevertheless, the court dismissed the case against the owner, finding that
the defendant could not have known that the plaintiffs attorney would rely on the
information without conducting further investigation or discovery. Id. at 839. The owner
had power because of its information and its possession of the boiler, but the court
imposed no duty on it. Id.; see also Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 Cal.
Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to hold an insurer liable for the destruction
of the vehicle that the plaintiff was driving at the time of an accident, even though
the insurer had taken possession of the car and destroyed it, because no special
relationship existed between insurer and plaintiff). These cases do not refute the
viability of Professor Shapo's theory, but they do demonstrate that it has not been
universally adopted.
106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
107. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between
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has a special relationship with the person posing a risk,
however, and the bystander has the ability to control that
person, the bystander may be required to prevent injury. 0 8 A
court applying this rule focuses on the relationship between the
non-actor and the actual perpetrator of the wrong, rather than
on the relationship between the non-actor and the victim.
The paradigmatic relationship triggering a duty to control
another is the parent-child relationship. Accordingly, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a parent must
control a minor child to prevent intentional or negligent injury
to a third person if the parent knows, or should know, that he
can control the child and knows, or should know, of the
"necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."'0 9
A similar duty falls upon a master to control the conduct of
a servant"0 and upon a property owner to control the conduct
of her licensee. 11 More generally, the Restatement provides that
anyone who has charge of a person known to have dangerous
propensities has an obligation to control that person. 112 Thus,
a mental health professional may have a duty to warn3 those
toward whom a patient expresses an intent to harm."

the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control
the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and
the other which gives to the other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 315 (1965).

108. Id.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965); see also Linder v. Bidner, 270
N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). The obligation to control a child may not apply to
an adult child. See Youngblood v. Schireman, 765 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding parents not liable for adult son's assault on his girlfriend in their home). Nor
does one sibling have a duty to control another. See Bell & Hudson, P.C. v. Buhl Realty
Co., 462 N.W.2d 851 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
111. Id. § 318.
112. Id. § 319. Such persons may include operators of hospitals or mental asylums,
id. at illus. 1, 2, jailers, PROSSER AND KEETON, supranote 26, at 380-85, and custodians
of children, id. at 383.
113. Perhaps the most publicized case in this genre is Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), in which an out-patient at the Berkeley Health Center
allegedly told his psychologist that he intended to kill a young woman who had spurned
his romantic overtures. Id. at 339. The patient later killed the woman. Id. at 341. The
California Supreme Court held that the health care providers owed a duty to the victim
because of their relationship with the murderer. Id. at 343-51. Some states have
defined legislatively the scope of the duty of health care providers regarding a patient's
actions. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).

458

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 27:2

D. Duty and the Injurer

Under the common law, one historical justification for holding
a party liable for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance was the
difficulty in thinking of nonfeasance as causing injury. 1 4 If the
defendant initially caused the underlying risk of injury,
however, the defendant's later nonfeasance in failing to aid the
victim would not prevent a court from imposing a duty to act.
Thus, one who exposes another to an unreasonable risk of harm
must exercise ordinary care to protect the other from that
risk." 5 Likewise, one who negligently injures another must6
exercise ordinary care to aid him after the initial injuries."1
Despite some horrific early cases to the contrary, 1 7 currently
8
one who innocently injures another must aid the victim."
Consistent with the innocent injurer's duty to aid, some states
have passed hit-and-run statutes making it a crime for a driver
involved in a car accident to leave the scene even if she did not
cause the accident. 1 9 These statutes extend the duty to aid,
requiring a driver involved in the accident to "render ... reasonable assistance" 2 ° to any person injured,' 2 '
presumably even the person at fault. 2 2 In the same vein, a
114. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 52-53. Causation is an essential element of
any tort action. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, § 41, at 263.
115.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965).

116. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, § 56, at 377.
117. E.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903), discussed at supra
notes 32-37 and accompanying text; Griswold v. Boston & Me. R.R., 67 N.E. 354 (Mass.
1903) (finding that railroad had no legal duty to help a girl struck by a train, where
the railroad was not at fault in injuring her), overuled by Pridgen v. Boston Hous.
Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467 (Mass. 1974).
118.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra

note 26, § 56, at 377 & nn.45-46; see, e.g., Tubbs v. Argus, 225 N.E.2d 841 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1967) (finding driver of car involved in an auto accident had duty to help injured
passenger, despite state guest statute that limited driver's liability for injuries to
passenger sustained in initial accident); cases cited in HARPER ET AL., supra note 49,
at 721 n.16.
Professor Epstein suggests a strict liability approach, under which a person who
negligently or innocently harms another is liable for the failure to rescue. EPSTEIN,
supra note 11, at 14.
119. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003 (West 1971 & Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:100 (West Supp. 1994); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, at 377.
120. CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003 (West 1971 & Supp. 1994).
121. Id.
122. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14: 100 (West Supp. 1994). Of course, leaving
the scene of an emergency does not result in civil liability if stopping and helping
would have done no good, because leaving the scene is not then the cause-in-fact of
plaintiffs injuries. E.g., Shroyer v. Grush, 555 So. 2d 534 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
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person may not intentionally or negligently prevent someone
else from rendering assistance to another.'2 3 For example, the
Restatement states that a person may not wrongfully obstruct
a highway and thereby prevent someone from rendering aid to
one in need.'2 4

E. Assumption of Duty

Tort law also imposes a duty of reasonable care where the
1 25
actor has already taken some steps to aid an injured person.
Once the actor assumes a duty, he must
exercise reasonable
2
care on behalf of the injured person. 1
1. When Does One Assume a Duty?-What is a sufficient
undertaking to trigger a tort duty? It would seem that
swimming out to a drowning person would constitute a sufficient
undertaking. But what about a promise to aid, such as saying
"I'll swim out to save you"? If the promise constituted an
undertaking unsupported by consideration, then, as noted
previously, tort law would be enforcing indirectly promises
unenforceable in contract.'2 7 A number of modern courts,
however, perhaps striving to see that justice is done, have found
that promises coupled with some minor reliance constitute an
enforceable assumption of a duty to aid another. 2 '
One rather general undertaking which has resulted in the
imposition of a duty to aid is a hospital's operation of an
emergency room. 29 The operation of the emergency room, in

123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 326-327 (1965).
124. Id. § 328.
125. See, e.g., Ocatillo West Joint Venture v. Superior Court, 844 P.2d 653, 655
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323-324A (1965).
127. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text (noting that promissory estoppel doctrine has eroded unenforceability claims).
128. E.g., Morgan v. Yuba County, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (finding
actionable a sheriffs failure to honor his promise to warn the witness to a crime of
the criminal's release on bail, resulting in the witness's death); Marsalis v. La Salle,
94 So. 2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (allowing recovery to cat bite victim who had to undergo
unnecessary rabies treatment after owner, who had promised to detain the cat for the
purpose of determining whether it was rabid, negligently let the cat escape); Crowley
v. Spivey, 329 S.E.2d 774 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (finding duty breached where a paranoid
schizophrenic woman shot her children after her parents had promised her husband
they would supervise her while the couple's children were with her).
129. See Barry R. Furrow, ForcingRescue: The Landscape ofHealth Care Provider
Obligations to Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 31 (1993).
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and of itself, may impose a duty on the hospital to provide
treatment even if the prospective patient cannot pay for the
treatment. 130 In one case, a court found that the maintenance
of an emergency room, the public's reliance on a hospital's
provision of the service, and the hospital's refusal to treat were
analogous to the negligent termination of gratuitous services
that, under1 Restatement (Second)of Torts § 323, results in tort
13
liability.
2. When May One Who Has Assumed a Duty Terminate
Rescue Efforts?-Once an actor has assumed a duty, she may
terminate her efforts short of actual, successful rescue if she
does not leave the victim worse off, either by increasing his peril
or by inducing the victim to forego other opportunities for help
in reliance on the actor's undertaking. 132 Some courts, however,
have imposed
liability even though the rescuer has met these
1 33
criteria.

F. Some Curious Incentives: Rules to Fix Rules

Cumulatively, the rules discussed so far result in a rather
odd set of incentives. The lack of a general legal duty to act
provides a person with no incentive to help another. But if one
assumes a duty by helping, a subsequent failure to exercise
ordinary care will result in liability for negligence. 134 The rules
actually provide a disincentive to act. In turn, other rules were
formulated, in part perhaps to mitigate this disincentive.
One way the common law has tried to encourage people to
act is the rescue doctrine. Under the rescue doctrine, a
tortfeasor who intentionally or negligently places a person at
risk maintains a duty to the original victim and to any rescuer

130. Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984);
Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969).
131. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961). Current federal
law mandates that any hospital participating in the Federal Medicare program and
maintaining an emergency room has an obligation to any patient seeking emergency
room treatment to determine if an emergency exists and, if so, to treat the patient's
condition until it is stabilized. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. c (1965).
133. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26, § 56 at 381-82; cf. Bartlett v. Taylor,
174 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 1943) (affirming landlord's liability for repairs undertaken voluntarily but negligently).
134. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 49, at 713-15; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 26, § 56 at 380; supra Part I.E.
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exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of the
emergency. 135 European civil law has the doctrine of negotiorum gestio, which allows a rescuer to recover from the rescued
person certain expenses incurred in rescue. 13 American case
law evinces some similar cases. For example, in Vincent v.
Lake Erie TransportationCo.,137 a court ordered the defendant
to pay the plaintiff for damage to the plaintiffs dock incurred
when the defendant moored there out of necessity during a
terrible storm. 13 Generally, however, an injured rescuer will
not recover in tort unless she can find a tortfeasor responsible
for the victim's injury. 139 Therefore, the rescue doctrine, even
assuming laypeople are aware of it, is only a band-aid: it
applies only if someone else placed the victim at risk, but does
not impose liability on anyone for not acting.
The law's incentives not to rescue may conflict with one's
moral sense. The tension would be more than psychological for
the physician whose professional credo impels him to treat the
injured in emergencies,"4 but whose lawyer warns that
helping may result in liability for malpractice.
To assuage this tension, doctors have succeeded in having
good Samaritan statutes passed in a number of jurisdictions.
These statutes provide limited or absolute immunity to a
person providing aid to an injured person at the scene of an
emergency.'' The effect of these statutes is that someone
aiding at an emergency may not be liable even though negligent. This result is anomalous because the due care standard
in an emergency takes account of emergency circumstances
and thus would protect the rescuer adequately. Predictably,
142
courts have interpreted these statutes rather narrowly,

135.
136.

See, e.g., Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.).
John P. Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life?, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 63.
137. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
138. Id. at 222.
139. Of course, the victim himself is considered a tortfeasor if he negligently
exposed himself to risk and a rescuer is injured trying to rescue him. Gambino v.
Lubel, 190 So. 2d 152, 157 (La. Ct. App. 1966). On the use of rewards as incentives
to rescue, see Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 85-93; Levmore, supra note 14.
140. AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS VI (1980).
141. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2793 (1991).
142. E.g., Willard v. Mayor of Vicksburg, 571 So. 2d 972 (Miss. 1990) (holding that
the Mississippi good Samaritan statute does not provide absolute immunity to those
under a preexisting duty to rescue, such as an ambulance driver); Frawley v. City of
Lake Worth, 603 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (denying summary judgment
where a police officer might have acted unreasonably in rescuing a truck driver).
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concluding that such statutes were designed to encourage
action by one who otherwise had no duty to act in an emergency. 143 As a result, the courts have held that a defendant
who had a preexisting duty to help the plaintiff
could not
1 44
statute.
Samaritan
good
a
under
escape liability
Thus American law has an odd assortment of tort rules. The
primary rule is the general rule that one has no duty to help
another. Compounding this rule's lack of incentive toward action
is the disincentive of the rule holding one who starts to assist
liable for negligent actions. The rescue doctrine is only a partial
solution in cases where someone's fault has placed the victim
at risk. While the no-duty-to-act rule remains, we have seen
several jurisprudential exceptions, most notably those based
on special relationships between the rescuer and the rescued
and those based on the rescuer having caused the initial injury.
Some cases have been squeezed
into a traditional exception,
45
despite an imperfect fit.

G. Legislative Responses and a Summary of Scholars

Some civil law countries have had statutes imposing a duty
to act, enforceable either criminally or civilly, since at least
World War II.146 Three states, Vermont,' 4 7 Minnesota, 148 and

143. E.g., Willard, 571 So. 2d at 974.
144. E.g., Sims v. General Tel. & Elec., 815 P.2d 151, 157 (Nev. 1991) (finding a
building owner had a preexisting duty to warn a janitor of a dangerous machine);
Praet v. Borough of Sayreville, 527 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (finding
police had a preexisting duty to provide emergency aid).
145. For a similar, more extensive discussion of the general rule's erosion see
Leonard, supra note 26, at 840-53.
146. See generally Aleksander W. Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative
Analysis, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 91 (discussing
such a duty in 15 European countries); Andrd Tunc, The Volunteer and the Good
Samaritan,in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 43 (discussing
good Samaritan laws in France); Kristin A. DeKuiper, Stalking the Good Samaritan:
Communists, Capitalistsand the Duty to Rescue, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 529, 537 (discussing the 1964 Czechoslovak Civil Code, "the first broad statutory use of tort law to
mandate good Samaritan behavior," as well as the law in the former Soviet Union);
Ferdinand J.M. Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans:A Comparative Study of
CriminalLaw ProvisionsConcerningFailureto Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 630 (1966)
(surveying European, Russian, Ethiopian, and Icelandic criminal codes); Note, The
Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631 (1952) (discussing
Soviet and French law).
147. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). Vermont's duty arises when a person
knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm and the person can render
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Rhode Island, 149 have enacted statutes which make the failure
to provide reasonable assistance to one in distress a
misdemeanor. Seven states, Colorado,15 ° Florida,' 5 ' Massachusetts," 2 Ohio,'53 Rhode Island, 5 4 Washington,' 55 and
assistance both without danger to herself and without interference with important
duties owed to others. Id. § 519(a). A person who complies with the statutory duty is
not liable in a civil suit unless she is grossly negligent or she expects to receive
remuneration. Id. § 519(b). Violation of the statute exposes one to a fine of up to
$100. Id. § 519(c). For a general discussion of the Vermont statute and its potential
for tort liability see Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25
STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972); see generally Lon T. McClintock, Duty to Aid the Endangered
Act: The Impact and Potentialof the Vermont Approach, 7 VT. L. REV. 143 (1982).
148. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). Minnesota imposes a
duty to assist at an emergency on any person who knows that another person is
exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm when the person can render assistance without danger to himself or others. Id. Anyone who acts at the scene of an
emergency without expecting remuneration is immune from civil liability unless they
act willfully, wantonly, or recklessly. Id. § 604.05(2). The rescuer is not immune if he
owes a preexisting duty to the plaintiff. Tiedeman ex rel. Tiedeman v. Morgan, 435
N.W.2d 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), (holding that homeowners owed a duty of care to
their daughter's 17-year-old boyfriend who became ill at their home and whom they
knew had undergone heart surgery). Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604.05(1) (1988). The same statute imposes a duty on professionals to
report the abuse of "vulnerable adults" in their charge. Id. § 626.557.
149. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (Supp. 1993). The statute imposes a duty to aid on
anyone at the scene of an emergency who, without danger to herself, can give
reasonable assistance to another in grave physical harm. Id.
150. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-115 (1986). The statute imposes no sanction for a
violation but grants immunity from civil liability for disclosure in certain circumstances. Id.
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 794.027 (Harrison 1991). The statute provides that a
person who is not a close relative of the offender or victim and who witnesses a
sexual battery must seek assistance for the victim by reporting the offense to a law
enforcement officer if the person has reasonable grounds to believe he has observed
the commission of the offense and if the person would not be unreasonably exposed
to any threat of physical violence for seeking the assistance. Id.
152. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 268, § 40 (Law. Co-op. 1992). The statute imposes a
duty to report to a law enforcement official a rape, aggravated rape, murder,
manslaughter, or armed robbery as soon as is reasonably practicable. Id. The statute
applies only to a person at the scene of the crime who knows that another is the
victim of one of the enumerated crimes and can make the report "without danger or
peril to himself or others." Id.
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (Baldwin 1992). The statute provides that
a person who knows a felony has been or is being committed shall report it to law
enforcement authorities. Id.
154. R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 11-37-3.1 to 3.4 (Supp. 1993). A person who helps in good
faith to report a sexual assault is immune from liability. Id. § 11-37-3.4. No doubt
this would include immunity from liability to an alleged assaulter arising out of
reporting the assault, as well as immunity from liability to the assaulted victim for
not doing more. Note that Rhode Island requires one to report a sexual assault, but
not a murder. See Osbeck, supra note 47, at 318 n.13 (questioning the logic of such
a distinction).
155. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 1988) provides that anyone who
witnesses the commission of an array of crimes denominated as violent offenses, id.
§ 9.69.100(1)(a), a sexual offense or attempted sexual offense against a child, id.
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Wisconsin,' 56 have
adopted laws requiring a person to report
157
certain crimes.
Although Professor D'Amato finds it desirable to impose a
limited obligation to act under the criminal law but not under
the civil law,' 8 other legal scholars have called for a tort duty
to rescue, at least under some circumstances.' 59 Others, like
Epstein, defend the no-duty rule.' 6' Before turning back to
that debate and how recent psychological studies might impact
into the worlds of
upon it, however, let me take a short detour
1
mythology.'
and
philosophy,
literature,

§ 9.69.100(l)(b), or an assault against a child that appears likely to cause substantial
bodily harm to the child, id. § 9.69.100(1)(c), must notify one of a number of appropriate enforcement authorities. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030(35) (West
Supp. 1994) for the definition of violent offense.
156. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2) (West Supp. 1993). The statute provides that a
person who knows that a crime exposing the victim to bodily harm is being committed
shall summon or provide assistance. Id.
157. See Steven J. Heyman, Foundationsof the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV.
673, 689 n.66 (1994) (discussing recent legislation to require reporting of violent
crimes).
158. Anthony D'Amato, The 'Bad Samaritan"Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 798
(1975).
159.

E.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

AND LEGISLATION 292-93 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (arguing for a duty
to rescue under certain circumstances); James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV.
L. REV. 92 (1908), reprinted in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 44,
at 1, 20 (calling for a duty to engage in. easy rescues); Wallace M. Rudolph, The Duty
to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499 (1965), reprinted in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 243 (proposing a model law imposing a
duty to act); Weinrib, supra note 27, at 251 (arguing in favor of a judicially created
general duty of easy rescue); see also SHAPO, supra note 104, at 8 (theorizing that
existing duties to aid are based on certain relationships of power); Leonard, supra
note 26, at 810, 862-68 (arguing that the per se no-duty-to-act rule ought to be
replaced by a duty based on a multifactor analysis); Levmore, supra note 14, at 879
(noting that the common law distinction between omissions and commissions is
vulnerable to attack); id. at 929-39 (predicting the development of a more general
duty to rescue); Robert J. Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritansand Moral Monsters:An
IndividualisticJustificationof the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV.
252, 287-93 (1983) (justifying a general duty of easy rescue on individualistic
grounds); Warren P. Miller & Michael A. Zimmerman, The Good SamaritanAct of
1966: A Proposal,in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 279;
Osbeck, supranote 47, at 319, 343-47 (calling for a duty to notify, rather than a duty
to rescue).
160. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 51-68 (defending the rule that there is no
duty to rescue).
161. I include in my discussion of mythology what some call religion.
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II. CAMUS, NICK NOLTE, ST. LUKE, ZORBA, BODDHISATTVAS,
SCHOPENHAUER AND THE MYSTICS

In this Part, I note generally some of the extra-legal discussions of the duty to act or rescue, before turning in the next
Part to some input from the fields of science and psychology.
Using the word "myth" in its broadest sense, as a story that
informs or shapes a culture, this is the mythological part of
my discussion. A prevalent theme in literature and mythology
is the call to compassionate, altruistic action. Indeed, the
philosopher Schopenhauer saw a direct connection between
adopting62 a compassionate, other-directed perspective and
rescue.1

A. Art and Action

In The Fall, Camus paints a horrific picture of an ex-lawyer,
Jean-Baptiste Clamence, who has left his native France and
taken up residence in Amsterdam. In France, Clamence was
successful in every aspect of life-society, romance, and the
practice of law, specializing in what he calls "noble cases."' 63
Clamence, whose voice is the only one heard during the novel,
characterizes himself as having been generous when he was
practicing law in France.' 64 But it became apparent to
Clamence that his generosity stemmed not from any real concern for others, but solely from what he gained from it. 1 5 In

his relations with the world he was a play actor. He pretended
to be noble because of what being noble did for him. Clamence
was a selfish altruist. Clamence recalls a night when he was
walking across the Seine:
I was returning to the Left Bank and my home by way of
the Pont Royal. It was an hour past midnight, a fine rain
was falling, a drizzle rather, that scattered the few people
on the streets. I had just left a mistress, who was surely

162.
163.
164.
165.
tragedy

See infra Part II.B.4.
ALBERT CAMUS, THE FALL 17 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1956).
Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 34-35 (theorizing that people commiserate with the survivor of a
for amusement and self-assurance).
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already asleep. I was enjoying that walk, a little numbed,
my body calmed and irrigated by a flow of blood gentle as
the falling rain. On the bridge I passed behind a figure
leaning over the railing and seeming to stare at the river.
On closer view, I made out a slim young woman dressed in
black. The back of her neck, cool and damp between her
dark hair and coat collar, stirred me. But I went on after
a moment's hesitation. At the end of the bridge I followed
the quays toward Saint-Michel, where I lived. I had
already gone some fifty yards when I heard the
sound-which, despite the distance, seemed dreadfully
loud in the midnight silence--of a body striking the water.
I stopped short, but without turning around. Almost at
once I heard a cry, repeated several times, which was
going downstream; then it suddenly ceased. The silence
that followed, as the night suddenly stood still, seemed
interminable. I wanted to run and yet didn't stir. I was
trembling, I believe from cold and shock. I told myself that
I had to be quick and I felt an irresistible weakness steal
over me. I have forgotten what I thought then. "Too late.
Too far . . ." or something of the sort. I was still listening
as I stood motionless. Then, slowly under the rain, I went
away. I informed no one.' 66
After that episode, Clamence's practice and his relationships
with others took a turn for the worse. 6 7 Ultimately he found
himself in a portside bar in Amsterdam where he acted as a
judge penitent-one who first engages in public confession and
later judges his listener's confession.'
In his confession
Clamence would adapt his words to his listener so that his
portrait of himself would become a mirror for his listener.'6 9
The "I" of the storyteller would become the "we" of the
storyteller, the listener, 70 and the reader. The listener would
begin to judge himself, then tell his story to Clamence the
penitent, who thus became the judge.' 7' In short, Camus
suggests that we are all guilty. We are all also judges-of

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

69-70.
73, 78-80.
138-42.
139-40.
140.
140-41.

WINTER 1994]

Aiding and Altruism

467

ourselves, of others , and of our culture.
Clamence's action, or
172

inaction, is symbolic of our own.
Would Clamence's rescue of the woman, or at least his attempt, have improved his life? Who knows? But the fact that
Camus should take Clamence's failure to rescue as a symbol
for a society's guilt testifies to the power of the image of
inaction. It is a sad comment on the effects of the failure to
act.
Of course, the rescuer is not always better off for his effort.
In the film Bananas,Woody Allen's character, Fielding Mellish,
attempts to defend a woman being attacked on a New York
subway by pushing her assailants off the train as the doors
close.'7 3 Unfortunately, the subway doors reopen and the
hoodlums refocus their ire on Mellish. Even beneficial action
is often an unpleasant experience for the charitable actor. That
is the feel, if not the message, of the film Down and Out in
Beverly Hills. 74 In that film a family on the edge of its culture
saves a homeless man, played by Nick Nolte, who had attempted
to drown himself in their swimming pool. Ironically, by the end
of the film it is less than clear just who is rescuing whom.

B. Religion and the Rescuer

1. The Good Samaritan-As literature has approached the
question of rescue, so has religion. The paradigmatic Christian
story of helping behavior appears in the New Testament,

172.

See, e.g., Herbert Fingarette, Some Moral Aspects of Good Samaritanship,in

THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 212.

Camus shows us the inside story of how the failure to come to a stranger's aid
turns out to be only the objective symbol of a life which is an inward mockery
of itself. The central figure-incidentally, he is a lawyer-is first called to
himself by his failure to save another human being from death; this failure soon
reveals itself to him as only the outward expression of a constant but covert
betrayal of others; and this constant betrayal of others he discovers to be only
an aspect of an inward self-betrayal. Camus presents and justifies his narrative
in human terms, but he explicitly connects it with traditional religious teaching
of damnation and salvation: the lawyer's living Hell is presented symbolically
as Dante's inner circle of Hell.
Id. at 219.
173. BANANAS (United Artists 1971).
174. DOWN AND OUT IN BEVERLY HILLS (Touchstone Films 1986).
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where Jesus tells the parable of the good Samaritan.1 7 5
Interestingly enough, as in Camus's The Fall, a lawyer plays
a prominent role in this parable. As St. Luke tells the story,
the lawyer asked Jesus: "Teacher, what shall I do to inherit
eternal life?" 176 Dealing with the lawyer as the law student is
accustomed to being dealt with, Jesus answered with 177a
question: "What is written in the law? How do you read?"'
The lawyer, obviously prepared for this line of inquiry,
adroitly answered: "You shall love the Lord your God with all
your heart, with all your soul, and with all your strength, and
with all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself."17 Jesus
praised the lawyer's answer.'7 9 Nevertheless, this lawyer, like
any lawyer, saw another issue lurking in this most difficult
question, an issue that has continued to plague us. He asked
Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?" 8 ° Jesus' answer was the
parable of the good Samaritan.
"A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he
fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and
departed, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a priest was
going down that road; and when he saw him he passed by on
the other side."' 8 ' Next, along came a Levite, who, like the
priest, passed by." 2
But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where he was;
and when he saw him, he had compassion, and went to
him and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and wine;
then he set him on his own
beast and brought him to an
18 3
him.
of
care
took
and
inn,

175. Luke 10:25-37. Indeed, as noted earlier, the title of the paradigm has invaded
the legal scheme, lending its name to various statutes exculpating actors at
emergency scenes from liability for negligence.
176. Id. 10:25.
177. Id. 10:26.
178. Id. 10:28. Indeed, the lawyer's answer in Luke is the same answer Jesus
himself provided when others asked him the same question in two of the other three
Gospels. See Mark 12:28-34; Matthew 22:34-40 (answering inquiry of a lawyer as to
what is the greatest commandment). The fact a lawyer is involved in two of the
teachings of this message is rather ironic in light of Anglo-American law's failure to
impose a duty to aid.
179. Luke 10:28.
180. Id. 10:29.
181. Id. 10:30-31.
182. Id. 10:32.
183. Id. 10:33-34.
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The next day when the Samaritan left the inn he gave additional funds to the innkeeper to care for the injured man,
84
promising to pay even more, if necessary, upon his return.'
After telling this story, Jesus then asked, "Which of these
three, do you think, proved neighbor to the man who fell
among the robbers?"8 5 The lawyer answered: "The one who
showed mercy on him,"' - to which Jesus responded: "Go and
do likewise." 8 7 Our neighbors thus include people we do not
even know, people who are not from our tribe, people who,
from all appearances, we might even take to be our enemies.
Before moving on, however, the story presents one dilemma
that deserves attention. Recall that the lawyer had initially
asked: "Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" 88 The
problem with which I am concerned is this: if I love and help
my neighbors, using that term most broadly, as I love myself,
but I do it to secure eternal "life" for myself, am I loving and
helping for the right reason? Put differently, do I really love
my neighbor if I act to benefit myself? In loving others to
assure my eternal salvation, am I ultimately being selfish? Are
my neighbors to me like Clamence's noble cases were to
him-food for my own insatiable self-interest? Put in Batson's
terms, if I love my neighbor for my own reward, my motivations are egoistic, but if I help my neighbor out of a primary
89
desire to improve her condition, I am acting altruistically.'
The key to understanding altruism may be compassion. Unlike
Clamence, the Samaritan had compassion, true concern for
another, not just for himself.9
2. Zorba and the Boddhisattva-Theconcept of compassion
is by no means unique to Western religion. According to
Buddhism, "All life is suffering." 9 ' Zorba the Greek expressed
the same sympathy more concretely:

184. Id. 10:35.
185. Id. 10:36.
186. Id. 10:37.
187. Id.
188. Id. 10:25.
189. See infra Parts III.C. and III.D.
190. Of course, perhaps the hope of eternal salvation is the carrot Christianity
holds out to induce altruistic action. Thus conceived, Christianity's hope is not unlike
the hortatory effect of law: it is designed to induce certain behavior.
191. This is from the Buddha's sermon on the Eightfold Path cited in JOSEPH
CAMPBELL,

THE

MASKS

[hereinafter MASKS].

OF THE GODS:

OCCIDENTAL

MYTHOLOGY

247

(1964)
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Whether a man's good or bad, I'm sorry for him, for all of
'em. The sight of a man just rends my insides, even if I act
as though I don't care a damn! There he is, poor devil, I
think; he also eats and drinks and makes love, and is
frightened, whoever he is; he has his God and his devil
just the same, and he'll peg out and lie as stiff as a board
beneath the ground and be food for worms, just the same.
Poor devil! We're all brothers! All worm meat!'9 2
What hope is there? The key for Buddhists is to treat all
beings with compassion.19 3 The story of the Boddhisattva,
Avalokiteshvara, is particularly enlightening on this point.
According to Mahayana Buddhism, a Boddhisattva is a
world savior "whose being is illumination." 94 The name
Avalokiteshvara means "The Lord Looking Down in Pity."'9 5
Avalokiteshvara is so called "because he regards with compassion all sentient creatures suffering the evils of existence." 96
Avalokiteshvara, in contrast to the lawyer listening to the
parable of the good Samaritan, has already attained what is,
for him, the penultimate condition. He has reached the
boundary of the void beyond all knowing, but, while poised on
the edge of Buddhahood, he turns back and vows that he will
instead bring all creatures to enlightenment.'9 7 Thus, he
makes what may be thought of as the ultimate sacrifice out of
compassion. The boddhisattva turns; and in turning, or
returning, he "dwells within (without exception) every sentient
98
being."
Thus, we are all one with this boddhisattva: the boddhisattva, the "embodiment" of compassion, is immanent. This is a

NIKOS KAZANTZAKIS, ZORBA THE GREEK 226 (Carl Wildman trans., 1952).
193. See MASKS, supra note 191, at 247 (stating that the result of accomplishing
Buddha's goals is compassion for others who had not); WALPOLA RAHULA, WHAT THE
BUDDHA TAUGHT 46 (2d ed. 1974) (stating that Buddhism fundamentally requires the
individual to develop compassion and wisdom together).
192.

194. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THIS BUSINESS OF THE GODS... 92 (1989); JOSEPH
CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES, 150 n.83 (1949) [hereinafter HERO]

("The word boddhisattva (Sanskrit) means: "whose being or essence is enlightenment.").
195. HERO, supra note 194, at 149. Avalokiteshvara is '[o]ne of the most powerful
and beloved of the Boddhisattvas of the Mahayana Buddhism." Id.
196. Id. at 149-50.
197. See id. at 149-71; see also JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC IMAGE, 221-24
(1974) (recounting the story of original boddhisattva's refusal to accept Buddhahood
until all others had attained their goals).
198. HERO, supra note 194, at 160.
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difficult idea for the Western mind to accept. Aristotilean logic
tells us that what is A cannot at the same time be not-A. 199 If
we are all one with the boddhisattva, however, we are all one
with everyone else. But our perceptions show us that we are
not totally one with others. Thus we are both different from,
and the same as, everyone and everything we see outside
ourselves. These are most troublesome concepts.
The story of the boddhisattva also presents us with the
alleged identity not only between humans or creatures, but
also the identity between time and eternity, the goal of the
lawyer speaking with Jesus. 0 0
The pause on the threshold of Nirvana, the resolution to
forego until the end of time (which never ends) immersion
in the untroubled pool of eternity, represents a realization
that the distinction between eternity and time is only
apparent-made, perforce, by the rational mind, but dissolved in the perfect knowledge of the mind that has
transcended the pairs of opposites.20 '
Thus, all things are one on some other plane of existence.
There is no reason to be good now, only seeking reward later.
Later is now, now is then, and then is later. The reason to act
compassionately now is that compassion is its own reward.
Perhaps compassion brings an understanding of the immanence of unity while even a glimpse of that unity triggers
compassion.
3. Mysticism: All Things Are One, Thou Art That-The
belief in unity, that all things are one, including time and
eternity, represents what Westerners sometimes call mysticism. 2° 2 William James wrote that mysticism has four traits:
20 3
ineffability, a noetic quality, transiency, and passivity.
Mysticism is ineffable because it'
"defies expression."20 4 It is
noetic because normally it is accompanied or followed by
states of knowledge. It is transient because mystical "states

199. See JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC IMAGE 8 (1974) (discussing the breakdown of logic).
200. See supra Part II.B.1.
201. HERO, supra note 194, at 152.
202. See generally EVELYN UNDERHILL, MYSTICISM (Image ed. 1990).
203.

WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 380-82 (Martin

E. Marty ed., Penguin Books 1982) (1902).
204. Id. at 380.
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cannot be sustained." 2 5 Finally, it is passive because the
mystic feels as if he is being held in the power of some greater
force.2 °6

While this discussion may conjure up an image of a yogi
sitting motionless on a bed of nails, Professor Stace identifies
two types of mystic states: introvertive mysticism and extrovertive mysticism. 207 The introvertive mystic experiences
extra-sensual mystical states inside herself. Some faculty
other than one of the five senses is the receiving device for the
signals that bring on and constitute the mystical state.20 8
Here, the image of the yogi is apt, as is the picture of the
traditional Christian mystic: a monk or nun, such as St.
Theresa or St. John of the Cross, starving in a cell attempting
to induce a mystical state. The extrovertive mystic, on the
other hand,
experiences the oneness of all things through his
2 9
senses.

0

Not all mystics are religious mystics2 10 and many non-religious mystics are extrovertive mystics. Aldous Huxley,2 11
William Blake,2 12 Lord Tennyson, 213 and Walt Whitman 21 4 all
had mystical experiences in which their senses were paramount. Indeed, while many religious mystics deny themselves
food and drink in order to trigger their mystical states, Huxley
ingested peyote in order to bring on his experience of one5
ness.

21

4. Mysticism, Schopenhauer, and Aiding Action-What
does mysticism have to do with the duty to act? Consider the
following quote from the German philosopher Schopenhauer,
who was influenced by Eastern philosophy:
How is it possible that suffering that is neither my own
nor of my concern should immediately affect me as though
it were my own, and with such force that it moves me to

205. Id. at 381.
206. Id.
207.

WALTER

T. STACE,

TEACHINGS OF THE MYSTICS 15-23 (1960).

208. Id. at 17-20.
209. Id. at 15-17.
210.

211.
212.
213.
214.
395-96.
215.

For one example, see ALDOUS HUXLEY, THE DOORS OF PERCEPTION (1954).

Id.
See UNDERHILL, supra note 202, at 106.

Id. at 238; see also JAMES, supra note 203, at 383-84.
UNDERHILL, supra note 202, at 238; see also JAMES, supra note 203, at
HUXLEY, supra note 210, at 12.
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action?... This is something really mysterious, something
for which Reason can provide no explanation, and for
which no basis can be found in practical experience. It is
nevertheless of common occurrence, and everyone has had
the experience. It is not unknown even to the most hardhearted and self-interested. Examples appear every day
before our eyes of instant responses of the kind, without
reflection, one person helping another, coming to his aid,
even setting his own life in clear danger for someone whom
he has seen for the first time, having nothing more in
mind than that the other is in need and in peril of his
life .... 216
Significantly, Schopenhauer chose rescue as the model of
how one's condition may affect another's feelings, just as
Camus selected the failure to act as a symbol of society's
fall.2' 7Schopenhauer said that neither reason nor self-interest
can explain the act of rescuing. Recall how Clamence devalued
his generosity when it was self-serving.2 1 Yet also recall the
parable of the good Samaritan with its message of compassion
alongside its self-serving payoff of eternal salvation.
According to Campbell, "Schopenhauer's answer to his
question is that this immediate reaction and response [to
provide help] represents the breakthrough of a metaphysical
realization-namely . . . 'tat tvam asi, thou art that,' 219 a belief
at the core of Hindu mysticism. 220 To Schopenhauer, the
metaphysical realization that 'thou art that' takes the physical
form of a compassionate act-rescue. Thus, the rescuer is a
mystic, or at least one who is experiencing an extroverted
mystical state when, through a sensual impression, the rescuer
has realized the similarity, if not identity, of himself and the
person he rescues."' It is this realization that prompts the act.

216.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE INNER REACHES OF OUTER SPACE 112 (1986) (quoting

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY 253 (1840)).

217. See supra Part II.A.
218. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
219. CAMPBELL, supra note 216, at 112.
220. See generally STACE, supra note 207, at 30-33 (1960) (recounting the use of
the phrase in the Chandogya Upanishad and other Upanishads, the primary texts of
Hindu worship).
221. In one account of a rescue, an African-American man tells how white co-workers
saved his life after a vat of hot tar exploded and severely burned him: "The guys on
the job, who were white, helped me. I was on the ground, on fire. They put the fire
out." Sara Rimer, Jobs Illuminate What Riots Hid: Young Ideals, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 1992, at A20.
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The discussion in this section, however, must give us pause.
It is not sufficient to say that the law ought to require rescue
because various religions, or writers, seem to encourage it.
Indeed, in this area the law has adopted the attitude that since
religion counsels rescue, the courts need not or should not do
so. Rescue is a spiritual matter, not a secular one.
It is contrary to commonly accepted modern notions of
persuasive legal or philosophical discourse to ground a duty to
rescue in religious doctrine. However, our view of our relation
with the gods, eternity, and our fellow humans may serve as
a jumping off point, not to jump out, but to jump in-to the
human mind, to an examination of what psychology can tell us
about some of these concepts, as well as what it can tell us
about rescuing in general.

III. ACTION, ALTRUISM, AND PSYCHOLOGY

In this Part, I hope to do several different things. First, and
most broadly, I examine why people help others. Do they help
to further their own self-interest or do they help altruistically,
out of a desire to help another? To answer these questions, I
examine Freud's explanation for action, as well as Batson's
hypothesis that feelings of empathy trigger altruistic action.
Additionally, I briefly set forth some biological explanations for
altruistic action. Second, this Part considers the scientific
evidence describing when people help. On this point I focus on
Batson's work and the groundbreaking studies of Latan6 and
Darley.
As an overriding theme, this Part examines the implications
of the scientific evidence on the current tort duty not to act. If
people do act altruistically, and people are likely to do so in
certain predictable circumstances, what rule would best accord
with those psychological conclusions? Alternatively, if people
act out of self-interest, at least sometimes, what legal rule best
accords with that evidence? Different rules might be appropriate under different factual and relational circumstances.
It ultimately may make the most sense to say simply that
there is a duty to act when reasonable people would act under
the relevant circumstances and to use psychological evidence
to identify some of the relevant factors. My analysis is both
descriptive and prescriptive because some current rules,
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particularly those imposing a duty to act when there is a
"special relationship" between the bystander and the victim,
are consistent with scientific evidence.
Of course, to understand the implications of the scientific
evidence on tort laws I must make some basic assumptions
about tort law. Tort law depends, in part, on why people do
what they do. To the degree that people act out of self-interest,
tort rules premised on deterrence can be very effective.2 2 2 A
rule threatening liability may trigger beneficent, or at least
efficient, behavior.
If people act out of altruism, however, what is the need for
legal rules? Rules still might express some truth about our
society. I believe we outlaw certain types of discrimination not
simply to deter the proscribed behavior, but also to express
our outrage at it. Therefore, recognizing a duty to act when
people might be expected to act, albeit altruistically, is to state
something about human nature, to expressly recognize our
capacity for compassion, something the law has not typically
done.2 23
Alternatively, if the evidence indicates that human motivations differ under certain circumstances, then either different
legal rules or a multifactor approach are appropriate. In this
subsection, I take seriously both of the above stated characteristics of tort law: deterrence and the reflection of societal
traits or values. Of course, saying that any of the psychological
evidence has any meaning to the law assumes that legal or
societal norms are meaningful at all in the helping-rescuing
context. I begin my journey through some psychological
evidence on the relevance of norms.

A. Do Norms Count at All When Rescue Is Involved?

What can psychology tell us about the relationship between
norms and rescue? If there is no salient relationship then one

222. This is the lesson of Learned Hand's negligence formula. Thomas C. Galligan,
Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated LearnedHand Formula,52 LA. L. REV.
323, 345 (1991); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution
of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 20-23 (1990).
223. Stating that one of the purposes of tort law is to compensate recognizes a
factfinder's ability to be swayed, at least in part, by compassion.
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would have to search for some other, non-normative justification for a legal duty to act. Alternatively, one might conclude
that the law should not impose a duty to act.
1. Latang and Darley: Norms Do Not Matter-The most
well-known, pre-Batson psychological studies of bystander
action or inaction are those of Latan6 and Darley.2 24 Latan6 and
Darley concluded that decisions whether to act rarely were
dictated by societal norms. Other factors concerning one's
interpretation of the relevant situation and the potential
rewards and costs associated with various courses of action were
predominant.2 2 5 In circumstances where "certain norms are
made salient, they inhibit action."2 26 In most circumstances,
however, norms are "vague, unspecific, and conflicting," 227 and,
therefore, may be "relatively unimportant determinants of
behavior."2 2 Latan6 and Darley concluded that "norms exist
as a sort of nominal theory of behavior. They are an easy and
socially acceptable after-the-fact explanation for one's actions
even 9though [they are] never considered in deciding what to
22
do."

Tentatively, Latan6 and Darley drew the same conclusions
regarding feelings of compassion or empathy. 230 Their general
conclusion in this regard was that a person was more influenced by the costs and benefits to himself of various courses
of behavior than by norms or other generalized feelings such
as compassion.2 31
Latan6 and Darley's conclusions regarding the indeterminative effect of norms on behavior imply that the law as a
normative tool might not encourage voluntary action by
imposing a duty to act. Neither a general duty to act, nor any
legal norm created to influence human behavior would be
effective. If, however, as Latan6 and Darley concluded, the
evaluation of the personal costs and benefits of alternative

224. BIBB LATANA & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY
DOESN'T HE HELP? (1970) [hereinafter LATANt & DARLEY].

225. Id. at 27-28.
226. Id. at 26 (basing this finding on a study of bystander participation in playing
frisbee in Grand Central Station).
227. Id. at 21.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 27.
230. Id. ("As with norms, [feelings of compassion or empathy] may provide an
overall predisposition to help or they may provide post hoc explanations for why we
have acted in a certain way.").
231. Id. at 7-28.
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courses of action is a better predictor of action than are norms,
then the law may induce action by imposing costs for noncompliance or rewards for compliance. A law imposing some
meaningful sanction for the failure to act might be more
successful in inducing action. Thus Latan6 and Darley's work
suggests that the deterrent goal of tort law has some
psychological base. The idea that legal norms play some other,
more general role, finds less support.
2. Norms May Matter: An Experiment From The 1960sSomewhat inconsistent with Latan6 and Darley's conclusions
regarding norms is an experiment conducted among non-law
university students in the 1960s in Germany, Austria, and the
United States.23 2 The students were presented with four
different case histories and asked a series of questions.23 3 Each
case history described a person who had failed to help someone in distress. 23 4 At the time, Germany had a good Samaritan
statute requiring action, whereas Austria and the United
States did not.23 5 When asked whether they would have failed
to act, as had the character in the case history, 37% of the
Germans answered that they would have acted, compared with
39% of the Austrians and 44% of the Americans.2 3 6 More significantly, 75% of the Americans thought that the law should
not interfere in such cases, but should leave the decision of
whether to rescue to the conscience of the individual. 237 Sixtytwo percent of the Austrians agreed, while only 42% of the
Germans agreed.2 3 8 Twenty-two percent of the Germans and
only 2% of the Americans thought that a person refusing to
assist should be incarcerated.2 3 9
Most revealingly, 86% of the Germans thought that it was
their legal duty to render legal assistance, compared with 26%
of the Austrians and 19% of the Americans. 24 0 As a lawyer, I
interpret the results as providing evidence for the proposition
that norms do affect what people believe: in this case, Germany

232.
Law, in
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Hans Zeisel, An InternationalExperiment on the Effects of a Good Samaritan
THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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has a legal duty to aid another in distress, while America does
not.2 4 1

3. Kohlberg'sPrincipledMorality-Dr.Lawrence Kohlberg's
model of principled morality also bears on the issue of norms
and helping behavior.24 2 Kohlberg believes that cognitive
development is affected by a psychological tendency to conform
to a given set of moral principles or values. To some theorists,
Kohlberg's principled morality is an important component of
an altruistic personality. If one of the reasons people help others
is to uphold moral principles, 2 43 then imposing a duty to act,
based upon some shared moral principle, might induce further
action because of the actor's belief that it was important to
conform to societal norms and the imposed legal duties based
upon those norms. This conclusion is in marked distinction to
Latan6 and Darley's general skepticism'about
the relationship
2 44
behavior.
and
norms
between
4. Simon's Docile Altruist-Dr. Herbert Simon, a Nobel
Prize Winner in economics, has developed an algebraic model
indicating, from a biological perspective, why organisms in a
culture might act altruistically. 24 5 Simon's theory is consistent
with Kohlberg's hypothesis.2 4 6 Simon hypothesizes that, even
in a world where a selfish gene drives the species, altruistic
behavior 24 7 can still be successful from an evolutionary
standpoint.2 48
Dr. Simon considers a population consisting of altruistic and
selfish individuals. 249 The altruistic individuals randomly

241. For another experiment reaching the conclusion that law affects belief, see
Harry Kaufmann, Legality and Harmfulness ofa Bystander's Failureto Intervene as
Determinates of Moral Judgment, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 77 (Jacqueline

R. Macaulay & Leonard Berkowitz eds., 1970).
Of course one may argue for the opposite conclusion if the Germans rescued not
out of a concern for the relevant norm, but due to the sanction imposed for violating
the law enforcing the norm. Note that saying that a law affects what someone believes
does not necessarily mean that it affects what someone actually does.
242. Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization-The Cognitive Developmental Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND

SOCIAL ISSUES 31 (Thomas Lickona ed., 1976).
243. C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION... TOWARD A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 6 (1991).

244. See supra Part III.A.1.
245. Herbert A. Simon, A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,
250 SCIENCE 1665 (1990).
246. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
247. Note that Simon is concerned with altruistic effect, not motive.
248. Simon, supra note 245, at 1665.
249. Id. at 1666.
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contribute additional offspring to members of the society
through their altruistic action. 25' Their altruism has its cost,
however, as each altruist has fewer children than each selfish
actor.2 5 ' Simon then accounts for the possible effect of social
learning on altruism, theorizing that social learning contributes in two ways to each individual's fitness:
First, it provides knowledge and skills that are useful in
all of life's activities, in particular, in transactions with the
environment. Second, goals, values, and attitudes transmitted through social learning, and exhibited in the speech
or behavior of the learner, often secure supportive
responses from others ... 252
Certain people are more adept at social learning than others. These people are docile, i.e., "disposed to be taught."2 5 3
Docile people learn what they think others in the society want
them to learn and believe. 25 4 Docile people are likely to learn
that compliance with norms is "good."
Docility fits in with the idea of bounded rationality, the
inability to evaluate independently everything in which one
believes.2 5 5 A docile individual will believe many facts that she
has not been able to evaluate personally.25 6 Importantly, the
docile individual may believe that it is proper to engage in
certain behaviors that will not make a positive contribution to
personal fitness, i.e., altruistic behaviors.25 7 If docility's overall
contribution to personal fitness outweighs the loss experienced
from "docile" altruism, there will be a net positive effect from
docility, including the docile acceptance of altruistic values in

250. Id.
251. Simon's hypothetical population consists of A, altruistic individuals, and S,
selfish individuals. If A and S were the same in all respects, each would have X
number of offspring. There are p individuals who are altruistic and 1-p individuals
who are selfish. Each A randomly contributes b offspring to members of the population as a result of his altruistic behavior. The cost of altruistic behavior to each A is
that each A has c fewer children than each selfish individual. Thus, the average
number of offspring of each A is: x-c+b(p). The average number of children that each
S will have is x+b(p). Id.
252. Id.

253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1666-67.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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certain situations. 258 Note the egoistic bent of the proposition-there must be a positive net benefit to the individual.
Assuming that altruistic action is one side effect of docility,
docility will contribute to the overall fitness of the population
so long as the gain from docility outweighs the loss from
altruism.2 5 9
Simon's work is relevant to the law because docile people
may be more likely to obey the law, even laws not enforced by
sanctions or reinforced by rewards, because they are likely to
learn that they should obey the law. The guilt and shame
associated with failing to adhere to societal norms are some of
the chief ways in which docility may operate to assure
compliance with societal norms.26 ° If one societal norm with
which docile people complied was a tort law requiring action
in an emergency, such a law might have an overall positive
effect on society, assuming that the positive effect of docilityinduced rescue outweighed its cost.
One will note the importance Simon ascribes to norms, in
contrast with Latan6 and Darley. Compared to Batson, Simon
does not concern himself with people's motives. The docile
individual may act to protect himself from the guilt and shame
arising from breaking the law, an egoistic motive. The important point is that docility, if it contemplates obedience to the
law, may explain partially the efficacy of a legal duty to act.
5. Summary of the Importance of Norms-Although the
evidence is inconsistent, norms may affect behavior. Latan6
261
and Darley downplay the relevance of norms in this context,
but Kohlberg's 262 and Zeisel's experiments 26 3 point to a
different conclusion. Moreover, Simon's theoretical model
relies on the docile individual's compliance with norms as a
limited basis for explaining altruism in the genetic context. 6 4

258. Id.
259. If altruistic action is one of the side effects of docility the average, docile
individual, A, will have X + d - c + b(c)p offspring; see supra note 251. The selfish
actor will have X + b(c)p offspring. Here, b(c) replaces the b used earlier; b(c) is the
number of offspring A's altruism adds to the population. See Simon, supra note 245,
at 1667. As long as d, the gain from docility, is greater than c, the loss from altruism,
docility contributes positively to the overall population. Id.
260. Id.
261. See supra Part III.A.1.
262. See supra Part III.A.3.
263. See supra Part III.A.2.
264. See supra Part III.A.4.

WINTER 1994]

Aiding and Altruism

Additionally, even if norms do not play a key role in inducing helping behavior, Latan6 and Darley's work does not
account for the possibility that the law may induce action if
costs or benefits are attached to non-compliance or compliance.
Their conclusions concerning the non-predictive value of norms
to provide aid seem to be limited to naked norms, that is,
norms with no consequences attached to compliance or violation. But their conclusion, that the costs and benefits of action
are more important than are norms in determining behavior,
indicates that rules with penalties or rewards attached may
affect behavior."' Their conclusions support tort law's claim of
deterrence.
Therefore, assuming the analysis and development of norms
is not psychologically irrelevant, let me consider when people
might be expected to help. Thereafter let me consider why they
so act. As to when people might be expected to act, I focus
again on Latan6 and Darley's work.

B. Under What CircumstancesMight People
Be Expected to Act?

1. Latang and Darley:Bystanders andAction-Latan6 and
Darley developed a psychological model of bystander behavior
in emergencies, a model which might prove quite useful to a
society shaping legal rules governing the same situation. They
noted that the issue of bystander action or inaction boiled
down to two questions: (1) "What is the underlying force in
mankind towards altruism?" and (2) "What determines in26a6
particular situation whether one person will help another?"
They believed that their first question was semi-philosophical
and probably never could be answered completely by empirical
data.2 67 Thus, they concentrated on the second question, noting
that it was "more specific, more mundane, [and] more
amenable to research analysis."2 68

265. LATANA & DARLEY, supra note 224, at 28.
266. Id. at 6.
267. Id.
268. Id. In comparison, Batson is less disposed to abandon the study of the first
question. See infra notes 371-73 and accompanying text.
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The bulk of Latan6 and Darley's research focuses on
bystanders in emergencies. 26 9 Latan6 and Darley characterize
as emergencies situations those which "involve[] [a] threat of
harm or actual harm"2 7 ° with "few positive rewards for successful action." 271' Emergencies are "unusual and rare
event[s],"27 2 which vary widely from one to another both in
their causes and in the kinds of intervention required to cope
with them. 2 3 Emergencies are unforeseen; one cannot consult
beforehand with others about what to do. 274 Finally, emergencies require "immediate, urgent action" under conditions of
great stress.2 7 5
Latan6 and Darley theorized that before intervening in an
emergency, a bystander must make a series of decisions.2 76
First, the bystander must notice that something wrong is
occurring; 277 the emergency event must intrude upon the
bystander's consciousness. Individuals pay only selective
attention to their environment. 8 People may block out certain
stimuli, including those events signaling an emergency. For
instance, the more noise present, the less likely a person is to
perceive an emergency. Likewise, the more potential danger
confronting a person, the less likely she will be to perceive
someone else as being in an emergency. Finally, and most

269. In the initial field studies reported, Latan6 and Darley found that people who
requested minor assistance were quite successful in obtaining it. LATAN9 & DARLEY,
supra note 224, at 9. This assistance included providing the time, directions, or,
frequently, exact change. Requests for the subject's name, however, were much less
successful. Id. Interestingly, the request for a name was more likely to yield success
when the experimenter preceded her request by providing some information about
herself, such as her name. Id. at 10-11. Latan6 and Darley posited that perhaps
people were more successful in getting help after providing information because the
subjects had greater justification either to help or to provide their name. Id. at 11-12.
Perhaps an introduction reduced the strangeness or suspiciousness of the request.
Alternatively, the information may have created a closer bond between the subject
and the requester. Id. Note that these early experiments did not involve emergencies.
These basic experiments support the current imposition of a duty to act when a
special relationship exists between the actor and the victim, as even a small degree
of familiarity seems to breed action. Perhaps then the law's special relationship
requirement requires too much affinity before imposing a duty to act, at least in a
non-emergency situation where only minor aid is needed.
270. Id. at 29.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 30.
273. Id. at 29.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 31.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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importantly for their experimental work, Latan6 and Darley
posited that being in a group, especially a group of strangers,
may place constraints on action. 279 For example, society
considers it impolite to pay too much attention to a stranger,
including noticing the stranger's plight. This norm may inhibit
action, because it inhibits noticing another's condition.28 °
Second, the bystander must perceive the event as an emergency rather than as something less urgent.28 ' It is often
difficult to determine whether a noticed event is perceived as
an emergency since many events can be interpreted in a
number of different ways. History, personality, present mood,
"the extent to which the individual is motivated to avoid belief
that [a situation] is an emergency, and the way he is influenced by the reactions of other bystanders" 8 2 all influence
the interpretation of an event as an emergency. Thus, if an
actor convinces herself that nothing is wrong, then she avoids
internal conflict over whether to intervene. In such situations,
an observer is influenced considerably by the actions or
inactions of others. If others apparently see a situation as not
being an emergency, great pressure is placed on the observer
to conform his impressions to theirs and to decide also that
there is no emergency.28 3
Third, the bystander must "decide that it is his personal
responsibility to act."28 4 Whether an individual witnessing an
emergency will feel personally responsible and take action
depends on several variables. The first is whether the bystander
thinks the victim deserves help, which is greatly influenced by
the bystander's social characteristics. 28 ' The second is whether
the bystander is competent.28 6 The third is the relationship
between the bystander and the victim. 28 7 Finally, the number
of bystanders who share the responsibility influences whether
the bystander will act.28 8 Feelings of personal responsibility
may be diffused if a number of others are also watching an
accident, because each person feels that others could or should

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Note that here Latand and Darley do rely on a norm.
at 33.
at
at
at
at

32 (emphasis omitted).
33-34.
33.
34.
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help. 289 A lone observer of an emergency may feel more
personally
responsible because she is the only one able to
290
help.
Fourth, the bystander "must ... consider what form of
assistance [s]he can give." 291 Generally, there are two alternatives: the actor may intervene directly 29 2 or indirectly. 293 For
example, the actor may save the victim or merely call the
police to report the incident.
Finally, the bystander "must decide how to implement his
action."2 9 4 Once a person decides to take action, success will
depend on how complicated the required actions are or how
much skill they require. Success also may be affected by
stress, 29 5 because the more stress an individual is under, the
more clumsy he will be.29 6
2. Experimental Confirmationof the Model-In a series of
experiments involving controlled emergencies, such as smokefilled rooms, 9 7 falling ladies,29 8 villains,2 9 9 fighting children,"'
and others, Latan6 and Darley confirmed their hypotheses,
particularly the notion that the presence of others adversely
affected action.
Latan6 and Darley concluded that the presence of others
"turns out to be a major determinant of bystander intervention
in emergencies-even though bystanders may not be aware
that they are being influenced."3 ' In each of the experiments,
bystanders were less likely to intervene if others were
present.0 2 Yet people persistently claimed not to be influenced

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted).
292. Id. at 34-35.
293. Id. at 34-35.
294. Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 36.
297. Id. at 43-54.
298. Id. at 55-67.
299. Id. at 69-77.
300. Id. at 79-85.
301. Id. at 89. Latan6 and Darley's theory that the presence of others inhibited
an individual's actions and reactions because it was embarrassing to be too attentive
in public to the condition of another was only partially supported. They concluded
that the relationship between the proprieties of public behavior and attentiveness to
an emergency is probably more complex than they had originally suggested. Id. at
88-89.
302. Id. at 123.
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by others.3 °3 Most subjects thought that the average person
probably was less likely than them to help, but still did not
think that the presence of others would affect the average
person's likelihood of acting.0 4 Thus, people systematically
underestimated the degree to which they were influenced by
others. Although people think of themselves as "sturdy
30 5
independents," they are, in effect, "moderate conformers."
The presence of others had a great effect on notions of
personal responsibility. 30 6 Latan6 and Darley posited that this
was due to the diffusion of responsibility. 30 ' A sole bystander
feels all the guilt for her inaction. If there is more than one
bystander, guilt is diffused and one becomes more likely not to
act. 30 ' Like responsibility, blame also may be diffused. 30 9 Thus,
when a group observes an emergency together, perceptions of
future punishment or blame may be slight compared to when
an individual observes an emergency alone.3 10
This notion of the diffusion of responsibility strikes me as
particularly persuasive when considering the Genovese case.3 1 '
In the Genovese incident, the presence of other bystanders
may have diffused the personal responsibility felt by the
neighbors. 31 2 Even if a person cannot see that others are
present, but nevertheless knows that there are other bystanders, she may assume that someone else is already taking
action. This may lead to a rationalization of inaction and a
reduction in the psychological costs of nonintervention.3 1 3
303. Id. at 124.
304. Id. at 124-25.
305. Id. at 125.
306. Id. at 121.
307. Id. at 90-91.
308. The notion of diffusion of responsibility is evident in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932), in which the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction of
seven accused rapists because the trial court had appointed "all members of the bar,"
id. at 53, to represent the defendants. Id. at 56. Finding that appointment inadequate,
the Court stated:
How many lawyers were members of the bar does not appear; but, in the very
nature of things, whether many or few, they would not, thus collectively named,
have been given that clear appreciation of responsibility or impressed with that
individual sense of duty which should and naturally would accompany the
appointment of a selected member of the bar, specifically named and assigned.
Id. at 56.
309. LATAN9 & DARLEY, supra note 224, at 90.
310. Id.
311. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
312. LATAN9 & DARLEY, supra note 224, at 101.
313. Id. at 91.
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The presence of others also may limit intervention for two
other reasons. First, others may inhibit one from doing seemingly foolish things.3 1 4 Second, the presence of others serves as
a guide to behavior. If others are inactive this will lead a
subject to inaction as well.3 15 Each of these phenomena involves different channels of communication between bystanders. While some require that the bystanders see each
other, others do not.316
Critically, when the bystanders in an emergency were
friends, intervention was more likely and occurred faster.3 1 7
Perhaps there was less fear of embarrassment among friends
and less likelihood that one friend would misinterpret another
friend's inaction. Perhaps friends are better at nonverbally
communicating concern, or perhaps friends are more likely to
discuss a situation and come up with a mutual plan for action. 31 8 These same trends were witnessed in an experiment in
which subjects brought a friend to the experiment with
them.31 9 In this experiment, although the friends were in
different rooms listening to the same victim, they were still
more likely to report an actor's feigned epileptic seizure than
those subjects who thought that a stranger was listening,3 2 °
even though the bystander-subject could not see or communicate with his friend.3 21 Latan6 and Darley suggest that this
result occurred because the bystander who had brought a
friend along knew that she would see the friend and discuss
the situation with the friend afterward.32 2 Maybe friends acted
more quickly and reported the feigned epileptic seizure to
maintain or earn their friend's good opinion or perhaps there
was no responsibility diffusion at all because the friends
viewed each other as "we" and not as "'me' and a stranger. 32 3
In a similar epileptic seizure experiment, mere acquaintance
with the victim seemed to have a significant effect on action.

314. Id. at 100-01.
315. Id. at 40-41.
316. Id. at 125-26.
317. Id. at 63. Both friends and strangers were slower to intervene than one
person alone. Id.
318. Id. at 64. This counteracts the effect of pluralistic ignorance. See supra notes
278-80 and accompanying text.
319. LATANt & DARLEY, supra note 224, at 93-112.
320. Id. at 105. Where a friend was listening, 100% responded; where a stranger
was listening, only 85% responded. Id.
321. Id. at 106.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 107.
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In fact, merely meeting a victim beforehand had a great effect
on the likelihood and speed with which a bystander went to
the victim's assistance.3 24 Latan6 and Darley concluded that
the subject may have thought that he was the only one who
3 2
had met the victim and thus could not diffuse responsibility. 1
"Subjects in this condition, and only in this condition, reported
that when the victim began to have the fit, they could
visualize him doing so. They could picture an actual individual
in distress. 3 2' Thus, the subject perhaps felt more empathy for
a victim he had met. A final explanation is that because the
victim and the bystander had seen each other, the bystander
might have felt more accountable, and anticipated that it
would be more painful later if he did not intervene.3 2 7 Acting
to avoid later pain would be an egoistic, rather than altruistic,
motive.
Latan6 and Darley also considered the effect of personality
traits on action, but concluded that the perceived number of
bystanders was a more important factor. 28 They concluded
that "[ilf people underst[oold the situational forces that can
make them hesitate to intervene, they may better overcome
them." '29 As to biographical variables such as background,
Latan6 and Darley found that "only two reached an acceptable
level of significance": the size of the community in which the
subject grew up, and the occupation of the subject's father.3 3 °
Those who grew up in smaller communities seemed more
likely to help than those who grew up in larger communities.3 31 Those who came from lower-middle-class backgrounds were generally faster helpers than those who came
from upper-middle-class backgrounds.3 3 2
Latan6 and Darley also found that the more familiar one
was with her environment, the more likely she would be to
help.33 3 This conclusion grew out of the results of an experiment originally designed to shed light on whether social class

324. Id. at 108. Response after meeting was 100%, in an average of 69 seconds.
Response without meeting was 62%, in an average of 166 seconds. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 109.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 116.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 117. Recall that these studies were reported in 1970.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 119.
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correlated with helping behavior. A passenger falling in a
subway received help more often than one who fell at an
airport.3 3 4 When Latan6 and Darley reconsidered the experiment, however, they concluded that familiarity with the
environment, not social class, was the significant factor.3 35 The
importance of familiarity appears to be rooted in the fact that
one in a familiar environment is not overloaded with stimuli
or fear of embarrassment. 33 6 Fear of harm also may be
somewhat reduced by familiarity with the environment.3 3 v One
in a familiar environment may feel a greater stake in helping
to keep it safe. 338 He also may feel more in control and thus
more likely to take some action to help another. 33' These facts
combine to make one more likely to act in a familiar environment.3 4 0
Latan6 and Darley also concluded that the longer one waited
to intervene, the harder it became.3 4 ' One reason for this
inertia may be that the longer one waits to act, the more
inconsistent later action is with earlier inaction. This is an
example of how self-observation may moderate behavior.3 42
3. Latang and Darley and a Legal Duty to Act-What can
the law learn from Latan6 and Darley? First, one important
factor in considering whether to impose a duty to act in a
given case is the presence or absence of bystanders. Latan6
and Darley's studies indicate that people in the presence of
others are much less likely to act in an emergency.3 43 Also, in
those situations in which people do act in the presence of others,
they act more slowly. 344 Thus, there is strong support for the
proposition that while a reasonable person may act when alone,

334. Id. at 118. In a subway, 83% helped. At an airport, 41% helped. Id.
335. Id. at 119.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 122.
342. Id. Latand and Darley ultimately concluded that their original model was
appropriate, although they made some modifications to it. Id. at 121-28. For
instance, they originally thought that a subject would make each decision in the
model in sequence; on reconsideration, however, they believed that motivations
appropriate to later stages often affected earlier decisions. Id. at 121-22. Likewise,
the phenomena of blocking occurred. Frequently subjects were confused and experienced conflict, and just did not make a decision. It was the lack of decision that
kept them from acting, not a decision not to act. Id. at 122.
343. See supra notes 301-27 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 317.
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that same reasonable person may not act when in a group. The
law might therefore impose a duty to act on a person who is
alone with the victim of an emergency, but not on a person
who is observing in a crowd. At the least, the presence of
others should be a relevant factor inshaping any duty to act.
Alternatively, Latan6 and Darley's conclusions concerning
the frequency and speed of action when bystanders were
friends rather than strangers,3 4 5 indicate that courts might
also consider the relationship between bystanders. Bystanders
who know each other are more likely to act. Therefore, the
stronger the bond between the bystanders, the more
reasonable it would be to impose a duty to act upon them.
Currently, tort law considers the relationships between victims and onlookers and between actual tortfeasors and onlookers,3 4' but not the relationships between onlookers. Yet
Latan6 and Darley suggest that "the failure to intervene may
be better understood by knowing the relationship among
bystanders
rather than that between a bystander and the
3 47
victim."
The relationship between bystander and victim, however,
may also be important, given Latan6 and Darley's own evidence that even a slight relationship between the actor and
the victim increased the likelihood that an actor would help in
an emergency.3 48 Current law thus makes sense by imposing
a duty to act on people who have a special relationship with
the victim.
But by limiting duty-triggering relationships to those relationships between family members or other close personal
relations such as master and servant, current law may be
underinclusive. Again, recall Latan6 and Darley's evidence
that a bystander who had become only vaguely acquainted
with a victim before encountering the emergency was more
likely to act, and to act faster, than a stranger. 349 Latan6 and
Darley's data thus suggest that our current rules are much too
narrow: courts could consider whether the bystander had any
relationship at all with the victim, not just whether a special
relationship existed. In this regard, the imposition of a duty on

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

See supra notes 317-27 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.B, I.C.
LATANt & DARLEY, supra note 224, at 128.
See supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
Id.
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one friend to help another, as in Farwell v. Keaton35 ° and
Ocatillo West Joint Venture v. Superior Court,3 5 ' may be psychologically appropriate. Likewise, the result in Depue v.
Flateau352 may be supported by the psychological evidence,
because the Flateaus had contact with Depue sufficient to lead
a reasonable person in their position not to drive him out into
the cold Minnesota night.
Finally, Latan6 and Darley's interpretation of their experiments suggest that the more familiar one is with the environment, the more likely one is to act, even if surrounded by
others.3 5 3 Thus, when deciding whether to impose a duty to
act, courts should consider the actor's familiarity with the
environment. Currently, they do not.
In conclusion, the strongest case for a duty to act may be
made when a person alone in a familiar environment observes
a relative or friend suffering an emergency. The case for a
duty becomes weaker the less familiar the environment and
the larger the number of people surrounding the bystander. A
duty still might be imposed, however, on groups of bystanders
who are relatives or friends. Latan6 and Darley's work
supports the case for a multifactor approach, similar to that
suggested by Professor Leonard.3 5 4 Now, let me address why
people act-what motivates one person to help another.

C. What Motivates People to Help?

1. Freud and Selfish Genes-Considering why people do
what they do from a psychological standpoint may shed some
light on how the law should treat inaction in a dangerous
situation. Traditional Western psychological models of behavior have assumed that people act out of self-interest. For
instance, Freud's psychological model of the id, ego, and the
superego, with his pleasure principle playing a key role in

350. 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976); see supra Part I.B.2.
351. 844 P.2d 653 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); see supra Part I.B.2.
352. 111 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907); see supra Part I.B.1.
353. See supra notes 333-36 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 26.
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human development, contemplated that people act in their
self-interest.3 5 5
Similarly, geneticists have maintained, consistent with neoDarwinism, 356 that a selfish gene ultimately is responsible for
the success or fitness of individuals and species.3 57 It is this
gene which promotes the "survival of the fittest." Selfishnessacting in one's self-interest-leads to survival. According to
this theory, those who acted for themselves most successfully
survived.
2. Genetics and Altruism-Some studies, however, have
now established that altruistic actions may contribute to
overall fitness. 35 8 Geneticists have found that altruism towards
close relatives can contribute to the fitness of the family.35 9
One hypothesis to explain action in these family relationships
is that the shared genes of the actor and the victim lead to the
actor's identification with the victim.36 0This then leads to action
through a type of vicarious egoism.
From a legal standpoint, the notion that altruism among
close family members is consistent with survival of the fittest
establishes at least some basis for a duty to act when a familial relationship exists between the actor and the victim. That
is, if science sees and even expects altruistic actions among
close family members, it is reasonable for tort law to require

355. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 108-15 (James
Strachey trans., 1949) (1940) (describing the psychic structure); SIGMUND FREUD, THE
INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 550-72 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1954) (1930)
(discussing wish fulfillment); CALVIN S. HALL, A PRIMER OF FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

15-30 (1954) (discussing the organization of personality as a means of fulfilling
desire).
356. See, e.g., Harold L. Kelley & John W. Thibaut, Self-Interest, Science, and
Cynicism, 3 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 26, 26-27 (1985) (discussing theory that
evolution selects behaviors classified as altruistsic which contribute to propagation
of the family).
357. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976). Dawkins discusses natural selection as occurring at the genetic level, but concludes that "[wie
have at least the mental equipment to foster our long-term selfish interests rather
than merely our short-term selfish interests." Id. at 215.
358. See W.D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour (pt.1), 7 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1, 14-16 (1964) (providing a theoretical model for hereditary
altruism); Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV.
BIOLOGY 35, 45-53 (1971) (noting conditions under which altruism develops); cf.
MARSHALL D. SAHLINS, THE USE AND ABUSE OF BIOLOGY: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
CRITIQUE OF SOCIOBIOLOGY 83-107 (1976) (describing why altruism is based on
ideology rather than biology).
359. See generally DAWKINS, supra note 357.
360. See Hamilton, supra note 358, at 1, 17 (describing a mathematical model
relating the likelihood of altruism to the degree of kinship).
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one to help close relatives. If genetics tell us that reasonable
people in certain relationships would act altruistically to help
another, tort law might require such people to act in those
situations. The closer the relationship between the actor and
the person at risk, the more likely would, and should, a court
impose a duty to aid. This genetic theory may provide some
scientific basis for requiring parents to aid their children.
But just as geneticists have looked beyond selfish genes to
explain behavior, psychologists have looked past self-interest
to discover instances where people act altruistically. If the
mind may at times trigger other-directed altruistic action,
then perhaps there is a psychological basis for a legal duty to
act. That is, the reasonable person may, in fact, act to help
another under certain circumstances.
3. Batson's Studies on Action and Altruism-While studying why people do what they do, psychologists have considered
whether there are situations in which peoples' motives are
truly altruistic. The most important recent psychological work
on action and the motivation for helping is Professor C. Daniel
Batson's work. Over the past ten to fifteen years, Professor
Batson has conducted a number of experiments on action and
motivation, and in 1991 Batson collected and stated his
conclusions in The Altruism Question . . . Toward a SocialPsychological Answer.3 6 1 He concludes that, under certain
circumstances, feeling empathy for another triggers altruistically motivated action to help that other person. Thus to the
extent reasonable people experience empathy for others,
people may be expected to act.
Batson defines altruism as "a motivational state with the
ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare."36' 2 An altruistic

361. BATSON, supra note 243.
362. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). Batson's earlier works on the subject include: C.
Daniel Batson et al., Empathic Joy and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 413 (1991) (rejecting the hypothesis that empathically
induced helping was egoistically motivated by a desire to share vicariously through
empathic joy at the victim's improvement); C. Daniel Batson, How Social an Animal?-The Human Capacity for Caring, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 336, 344 (1990)
(concluding from empirical evidence that "we are capable of caring for others for their
sake and not just our own," with some qualifications); C. Daniel Batson et al., Five
Studies Testing Two New EgoisticAlternatives to the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis,
55 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 52 (1988) (defending the hypothesis that the
empathic motivation to help is at least partially altruistic); C. Daniel Batson,
ProsocialMotivation: Is It Ever Truly Altruistic?, 20 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 65 (1987); C. Daniel Batson et al., Where is the Altruism in the Altruistic
Personality?,50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212, 220 (1986) (presenting an
experiment and concluding that researchers' conclusions about whether there is an
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act is, therefore, one in which the actor is motivated by a
desire to further another's interests rather than his own. 363 Of
course, in the process of ultimately benefiting another, one
may experience pleasure or may benefit himself.364 If the
actor's ultimate
goal is to benefit another then his motivation
35
altruistic.
is
On the other hand, "[e]goism is a motivational state with the
ultimate goal of increasing one's own welfare."36 6 One may act
egoistically not only to further one's own self-interest by
receiving a material reward, but also to receive the psychological reward of avoiding unpleasant feelings, including
those caused by seeing another person suffer. 367 An egoistically
motivated action may benefit another. What determines
whether an action is egoistic or altruistic is not the result of
the action, but rather the person's goal or motivation in
pursuing that action. 68
While Batson uses the word "altruistic" to describe an act
done with altruistic motives,36 9 many legal scholars use the
word to refer to acts having altruistic effect, not necessarily
altruistic motive. For example, Landes and Posner refer to
what they describe as "reciprocal altruism," a situation in
which one person acts to help another in the hope that sometime in the future the person helped or another member of
society will subsequently act to benefit the actor. 370 Batson's

altruistic personality depends on their definitions of altruism); C. Daniel Batson et
al., Influence of Self-Reported Distress and Empathy on Egoistic Versus Altruistic
Motivation to Help, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 706 (1983) (concluding from
empirical evidence that distress and empathy are distinct reactions to witnessing
another's pain, and that the two reactions lead to, respectively, egoistic and altruistic
motivations to help); see also Jay S. Coke et al., Empathic Mediation of Helping: A
Two-Stage Model, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752, 765 (1978) (finding
support from empirical evidence for the hypothesis that taking another's perspective
increases one's empathy for the other, which in turn increases helping behavior).
363. BATSON, supra note 243, at 6-9.
364. Id. at 6-7.
365. Id. at 7.
366. Id. (emphasis omitted).
367. Id. at 8.
368. Id. A few side issues must be examined. First, the terms egoism and altruism
do not apply to mere reflex action, where actions are not tied to motivation. Id. at 9.
Second, a single motive cannot ultimately be both egoistic and altruistic, although
egoistic and altruistic motives may coexist. Id. at 8-9. Third, a person may be
unaware of his or her true motivations. Id. at 9. Fourth, a motive will not necessarily
induce action. Id.
369. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
370. Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 93. But note that Landes and Posner
concern themselves only with altruists unmotivated by the expectation of compensation. Id.
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definitional scheme would classify reciprocal altruism as
egoistically motivated since it is done for a later personal
benefit.
Batson hypothesizes that "feeling empathy for a person in
need evokes altruistic motivation to help that person."3 7 '
Batson states:
[e]mpathy ...

refers to ...

emotions ...

that are more

other-focused than self-focused, including feelings of
sympathy, compassion, tenderness, and the like. Defined
in this way, empathy is distinct from feelings of personal
distress . . . , but it is indistinguishable from what many
philosophers and early psychologists call pity, compassion,
or tenderness.3 72
Thus, according to Batson, empathy involves a373feeling which
is focused on others, rather than on one's self.
It must be noted, however, that Batson's definition of
empathy does not entail a breakdown of ego boundaries such
as the mystic sense of oneness described in Part II.B. Batson
states that the terms "altruistic" and "egoistic" "assume a
distinction between self and other: At issue in defining
motives as egoistic or altruistic is whether the goal is the self's
welfare or the other's welfare."37 4 In contrast, a breakdown of
the self-other distinction would mean that "we are
psychologically indistinguishable from the other." 375 Batson

371. BATSON, supra note 243, at 74.
372. Id. at 86 (citations omitted).
373. For a similar definition of"empathy" based upon the psychological literature,
see Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987),
wherein the author states:
Although the literature of empathy manifests disagreement about what is or is
not "empathy," rather than projection, sympathy, or what have you, there are
three basic phenomena captured by the word: (1) feeling the emotion of another;
(2) understanding the experience or situation of another, both affectively and
cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the
other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing the distress of another
(hence the confusion of empathy with sympathy and compassion). The first two
forms are ways of knowing, the third form a catalyst for action.
Id. at 1579.
374. BATSON, supra note 243, at 55. See supra notes 362-370 and accompanying
text for Batson's definitions of egoism and altruism.
375. See BATSON, supra note 243, at 55 (citation omitted).
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occurs fully only "in some mysbelieves that this breakdown
376
tical states," if at all.
4. PseudoaltruisticMotives-Freudviewed helping actions
as egoistically motivated. He believed that people learn to love
and help others, in large part, to benefit themselves.3 7 7 Freud
wrote about a struggle between the life force, Eros, and the
death force, Thanatos, which manifests itself in the development of the superego, or conscience.3 78
[A]ggressiveness is introjected, "internalized"; in fact, it is
sent back where it came from, i.e., directed against the
ego. It is there taken over by a part of the ego that distinguishes itself from the rest as a super-ego, and now, in the
form of "conscience," exercises the same propensity to
harsh aggressiveness against the ego that the ego would
have liked to enjoy against others. The tension between
the strict super-ego and the subordinate ego we call the
sense of guilt; it manifests itself as the need for punishment.37 9

376. Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 373, at 1581 (characterizing an early
psychotherapeutic form of empathy "as not a dissolution of 'ego boundaries' or
absorption of self by other-[but as] a means of relating to another or making another
intelligible"). One of Batson's reviewers appropriately notes the relevance of mystical,
or what she calls "transcendental," experiences to the action/inaction debate.
From the spiritual perspective, one can easily note that for millennia, people
have testified to transcendent experiences in which they learned that all
humanity is one. A ramification of such a lesson is that what happens to one
person happens to all people. Thus, helping a neighbor, stranger, friend,
relative, or oneself are all in essence the same thing....
...The healthy person, however, clearly understands self-other boundaries.
He or she can choose to be of egoistic help to others, seeking to ease empathic
discomfort or to invest in reciprocal help-giving relationships. However, he or
she can also proceed further developmentally and deliberately choose the
blurred ego boundaries of the transcendent state. Help rendered then becomes
altruistic .... When driven by transcendent awareness . . . [slacrifice is an
irrelevant concept.
Penelope Thrasher, On Altruism: Comment on Batson, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 163
(citations omitted).
377.

See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS

171 (G. Stanley Hall trans., 1920) ("Even those persons whom the child seems to love
from the very beginning, it loves at the outset because it has need of them, cannot
do without them, in other words, out of egostical motives."). This notion is somewhat
consistent with the biological models of helping behavior. See supra notes 358-60 and
accompanying text.
378.

SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 101-05, 132 (Joan

Riviere trans., 1930).
379. Id. at 105.
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Freud contended that a civilized person endures this psychological conflict because of his need to live with others.380 The
superego is the force within the individual which inhibits her
aggression against others. The superego allows us to coexist in
a society. Thus, the superego impels us to love our neighbors
as ourselves, or at least to say that we should, and to prevent
us from doing what human nature, the id and ego, would
naturally lead us to do. Freud believed that:
[IIndividual development seems to us a product of the
interplay of two trends, the striving for happiness, generally called "egoistic," and the impulse towards merging
with others in the community, which we call "altruistic."
...
In individual development, as we have said, the main
accent falls on the egoistic trend, the striving for happiness; while the other tendency, which may be called the
"cultural" one, usually contents itself with instituting.
restrictions.3 8 1
Batson characterized Freud as believing that "[c]oncern for the
welfare of others is something that civilization can extract
from the individual only with the sharp whip of guilt .... 382
Thus, Freud believed that even "altruistic" actions are selfishly, or even egoistically, motivated. Actions which appear
altruistic are actually motivated by a need to curb truly selfserving, natural action, rather than a desire to help another.
Curbing that action is still egoistically motivated, because
unhindered, self-interested action would lead to the destruction of civilized society. Thus, in Freud's view the preservation
of society through apparently
altruistic action is really moti38 3
vated by self-interest.
Freud's view of the super-ego, altruism, and instituting
restrictions is somewhat consistent with the traditional legal
view that there is no duty to act. Many laws forbid certain
actions, while few require action. The law, therefore, is
consistent with the notion that human nature is basically
egoistic. It would be unreasonable to require people to help
when people only become concerned with others when such

380. Id. at 134-35.
381. Id. at 134.
382. BATSON, supra note 243, at 36.
383. The idea of reciprocal altruism is similar: people help another now to help
themselves later. See supra text accompanying note 370.
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concern is self-benefiting. Requiring action would not comport
with Freudian notions of psychological reality. It would ask
too much. A duty to act based on Freudian concepts clearly
would not be grounded in Batsonian altruism. Rather, it would
be supported by the notion that a limited duty to act is, in
some way, good for most individuals. It would be justified not
solely by the good done for the rescued victim, but more by the
good received by the rescuer or the public. This point moves us
to consider the basic relationship between egoism and helping.
As Freud noted, when a person acts to rescue or help another, a number of egoistic motivations may be implicated.38 4
For instance, the helper may anticipate feeling good about
himself if he helps. Alternatively, he may anticipate reward
either from society or the individual aided. If people act in
hope of gaining rewards, the law could encourage rescue by
providing a reward for those who do rescue. 38 5 Arguably, this
is what the maritime law of salvage does when it awards a
"bonus" to the salvor of maritime property.3 86
Alternatively, people may act not simply to obtain rewards
or to feel good about themselves, but also to avoid punishment
or to avoid feelings of guilt or shame, all egoistic motives. If a
person's motivation is to avoid punishment, one way to
encourage action would be to create a rule that punishes a
person if he fails to act. If people act to avoid guilt, the law
could provide a rule which increases the guilt experienced
from failing to act. If detection is unlikely, punishment or
threatened liability for failing to act still deter to some extent:
one would feel guilty for breaking the law; that guilt, or the
desire to avoid guilt, might encourage one to act. Docile
387
individuals would be most likely to act to avoid this guilt.
If people act selfishly to maximize their wealth, a reward for
rescuing, or a penalty for not rescuing would be most likely to
encourage socially desirable action. Egoism would dictate
action as long as the ex ante net costs of acting, assuming
there may be other benefits than simply avoiding liability,
were lower than the potential liability for failing to act,
discounted to pre-rescue value.

384. See supra notes 377-82 and accompanying text.
385. See Levmore, supra note 14, at 882-85.
386. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 500-21 (1987)
(discussing the law of marine salvage).
387. See supra Part III.A.4.
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5. PureAltruism-Alternatively,one may act out of a truly
altruistic motivation. While helping another, one also may
incidentally satisfy some egoistic desire such as avoiding guilt,
receiving a reward, or avoiding unpleasant feelings. However,
if an actor's primary motive is to benefit another, then the
motivation for action is altruistic.
Studies have indicated that feeling empathy for another
increases helping behavior.3 8 8 Importantly, studies have also
indicated that feelings of empathy may be manipulated.3 89 If
one is told to attempt to imagine what the victim in an experiment is feeling, one's empathy for that individual will
increase.3 9 ° If one is told that she should simply observe the
victim, however, less empathy will be evoked.39 1

D. Batson's Model of Helping Behavior
To test the motivations of people who helped when feeling
empathy, Batson created a model with three "paths" toward
helping behavior.3 9 2 On the first path, people act to receive
rewards or avoid punishment. On the second path, based on
aversive arousal reduction, people help another in distress to
avoid their own unpleasant feelings generated by the victim's
plight. Paths one and two are egoistically motivated, and may
be expressed simultaneously.3 9 3 The third path is Batson's
empathy-altruism hypothesis, which states that people feel
empathy and act on it out of an altruistic motivation.3 9 4

388. E.g., BATSON, supra note 243, at 91-96; John F. Dovidio et al., Specificity of
Empathy-Induced Helping: Evidence for Altruistic Motivation, 59 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 249 (1990); Nancy Eisenberg & Paul A. Miller, The Relation of
Empathy to Prosocial and Related Behaviors, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 91 (1987); Dennis
L. Krebs & Dale T. Miller, Altruism and Aggression, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 1 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985); Dennis L. Krebs,
Empathy and Altruism, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1134 (1975); Lynette S.
Unger, Altruism As a Motivation to Volunteer, 12 J. ECON. PSYCH. 71, 75-76 (1991)
(citing evidence of the empathic basis of altruism).
389. See studies discussed in BATSON, supra, note 243, at 93-96.
390. Id. at 94.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 74-105.
393. Id. at 78.
394. Id. at 83-90. Each path of action requires that the actor perceive another as
being in need. Id. at 75. Perception of need is the "recognition of a negative discrepancy between the other's current and potential states in one or more dimensions
of well-being." Id. These dimensions include freedom from unpleasant states, such as
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1. Path One: Expectancy of Reward or Punishment-On
path one, where people act to garner rewards or avoid punishment, the potential rescuer must expect a reward for
helping, a punishment for not helping, or some combination of
the two. 39 5 The egoistic motive to gain rewards or avoid
punishment is the motivational state. The magnitude of the
motivation depends upon two factors: the magnitude of the
anticipated reward or punishment, and the potential rescuer's
need for the anticipated reward or punishment.3 96 This need
may include a need for enhanced self-esteem, a need for relief
from bad feelings, or a need for the continuation of good
feelings .
On path one, the potential actor will calculate the costs and
benefits of each potential response. 398 Four behavioral responses are possible: helping, letting another help, escaping,
or doing nothing. The actor will engage in whichever response
has the greatest perceived relative net benefit to himself. If
seeking rewards is thereason one acts, helping need not be
successful to satisfy the actor's motivational needs, because
rewards may be bestowed even if one's help is not successful.
Similarly, if one fears self-punishment for not acting, a third
person's help may sufficiently abate any uncomfortable
feelings. Finally, escaping without acting may effectively avoid
societal or even self-punishment.

'physical pain, negative affect, anxiety, and stress," and the experience of pleasant
feelings, such as "physical pleasure, positive affect, satisfaction, and security." Id.
Perception of need is a function of three necessary, but not individually sufficient,
factors: (1) "a perceptible discrepancy ... between current and potential states on
some dimension [s]of well-being"; (2) "sufficient salience of these states, so that each
can be noticed and a comparison made"; and (3) 'the perceiver's attention being
focused on the person in need." Id. Perception of need varies in magnitude according
to three factors: (1) "the number of dimensions of well-being on which discrepancies
are perceived," (2) "the size of each discrepancy," and (3) "the potential helper's
perception of the importance of each of these dimensions for the person in need." Id.
Note the relevance of Latand and Darley's experiments, which concluded that the
most important factor bearing on perception of need was the awareness of others'
being present. See supra Part III.B.2.
395. Rewards and punishment may include "being paid, gaining social approval,
or] may also be more subtle, such as receiving esteem in exor avoiding censure. . [.
change for helping, complying with social norms, complying with internalized
personal norms, seeing oneself as a good person, or avoiding guilt." BATSON, supra
note 243, at 77 (citations omitted).
396. Id. at 78.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 81. This cost/benefit calculus may take only a matter of seconds. Id.
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If personal guilt arises from inaction and a person feels
obligated to comply with societal rules, then a rule requiring
action may indeed encourage action as long as the motivation
to act is to avoid punishment. Liability for failure to act would
have a similar effect on people motivated by wealth maximization concerns. Path one is consistent with law's deterrence
function. Alternatively, if one helps in hope of gaining a
reward, a legal scheme providing rewards for helping might
trigger action. If path one motivation is the primary motive for
helping, a legal duty to act, at least in certain situations,
might play a key role in inducing helping behavior.
2. Path Two: Aversive Arousal Reduction-Pathtwo is an
aversive arousal reduction path. Once again, the actor must
perceive another in need, but on path two the internal
response is an experience of personal distress caused by seeing
another in need or distress. 99 "The magnitude of this aversive
vicarious emotion appears to be a function of three factors: the
magnitude of the perceived need, its salience, and its personal
relevance to oneself."4 °0 Salience and personal relevance to
one's self increase with a feeling of "we-ness."4 1 The more one
identifies with the person in need, the more she will not only
be aware of the situation but will see the situation as
personally relevant. The actor's motivational state in the
aversive arousal model is to reduce personal distress, an
egoistic motive.40 2 As in path one, the actor engages in a
cost/benefit analysis. His behavioral response will be either
helping, allowing another to help, or escaping.40 3 Here, the
actor escapes not to avoid punishment but to avoid the
stimulus which creates the unpleasant feelings.40 4 Physical
escape is probably the only effective escape here. Short of
escape, helping is the only way to avoid or abate the unpleasant feelings caused by witnessing another in distress.40 5
A rule requiring action would seem most relevant when path
one and two motivations overlapped. That is, if the negative
feelings experienced when one sees another in distress coexist
with a fear of punishment or liability, or hope of reward,

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 77.
(citations omitted).
at 78.
at 80.
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perhaps a legal duty to act, imposing punishment or liability
for failing to act might heighten the negative feelings experienced when one witnesses another in distress.
3. Path Three: The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis-The
third path also requires that the actor perceive another in
need, but on path three that perception leads to a unique
internal response: empathy.4 °6 The actor imagines how the
person in need is affected by the situation, either by recalling
a similar situation or by imagining how the situation must feel
to the victim.4 °v Limits on adopting the perspective of another
depend partially upon the extent to which one becomes
engrossed in reminiscences.4 s In the laboratory, perspective
adoption often is induced by instructing the subject to imagine
how the other person, the victim, is feeling. 40 9 Another way to
induce perspective-taking in the laboratory is to use subjects
who have had prior experience in similar situations or who are
attached somehow to the victim.4 10
Attachment refers to "love, caring, feeling close, we-feeling,
or bonding."4 1 ' The greater the attachment, the greater the
likelihood of adopting that person's perspective. 4 12 The strength
of the felt attachment can affect the magnitude of empathy.
Path three motivation is altruistic. The magnitude of the
altruistic motivation evoked by empathy is a direct function of
the magnitude of the empathic emotion experienced. 41 3 Even
though the motivation on path three is altruistic, the actor still
engages in a hedonic cost-benefit calculus.4 14 Here again, as in
path two, helping must-be effective. Unlike path two, however,
there is no consideration of escape, because escaping will not
help the victim.4" 5 The only ways to deal with the altruistic
motivation are to help or to get help.

406. Id. at 83.
407. Id.
408. Id. Two factors are relevant to the adoption of a perspective: (1) the ability
to adopt another's perspective, and (2) "a perspective-taking set, that is, a set to
imagine how the person in need is affected by his or her situation." Id. at 84.
409. See supra notes 388-91 and accompanying text.
410. BATSON, supra note 243, at 84-85.
411. Id. at 85.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 87.
414. Id. at 88-89.
415. Id.
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If the empathy-altruism hypothesis holds weight, the effectiveness of a legal duty to act may vary with the level of
empathy experienced or with the level of attachment. In this
light, the law's imposition of a duty to act where there is a
special relationship between an actor and the person at risk
makes some sense.4 16 Similarly, current law regarding special
relationships is consistent with the "reasonable person" standard of negligence law. The model implies that the reasonable
person who is psychologically attached to someone in distress
will act. Thus, a legal duty to act in circumstances in which the
model predicts action would merely dictate what the psychologically reasonable person would do under the same circumstances
anyway.
In summary, the motivation to help on Batson's paths one
and two is egoistic while the motivation to help on path three
is altruistic. Feeling empathy for another and responding to that
empathy with action, however, do not necessarily establish that
the motivation to act in such a circumstance is altruistic rather
than egoistic. For instance, if one experiences empathy for
another in distress, one may act to relieve the feeling of
empathy not because of an altruistic motivation to help the
other but because of an egoistic motivation. Empathy may
trigger an egoistic motivation to help, such as avoiding
punishment, receiving a reward, or avoiding some aversive
arousal triggered by the empathy.4 1 7 One feeling empathy on
path three may end up on paths one or two. 41 8 To determine
whether empathically aroused individuals act out of altruistic
or egoistic motivation, Batson conducted a broad array of
experiments.
4. Experimental Confirmation-(a)Disprovingthe Aversive
Arousal Reduction Model-In his most recent book, Batson first
recounts experiments dealing with the aversive arousal
reduction model,4" 9 noting that it is the most popular explana4 20
tion for helping behavior when one experiences empathy.
Using Batson's paths, the aversive arousal reduction model
posits that when a person on path three feels empathy, she
shoots up to path two, where her subsequent acts are motivated
by a selfish desire to reduce unpleasant personal feelings

416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

See supra notes 411-12 and accompanying text.
BATSON, supra note 243, at 96-99.
Id. at 97, 99.
See id. at 109-27.
Id. at 98-99.
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triggered by the feelings of empathy. 421 This explanation of the
empathy helping relationship is akin to the path two model
described above,4 22 although here, seeing another in distress
causes empathy, which in turn causes the need to reduce the
negative feelings caused by the empathy. In contrast, on path
two, seeing another in distress triggers negative feelings directly
and causes one to act to reduce those negative feelings.4 23
Batson's experiments confirmed the empathy-altruism hypothesis, not the aversive arousal reduction hypothesis.4 24 Thus, one
who feels empathy acts to relieve the suffering of another, not
to avoid empathically induced aversive arousal. In one context
where the cost of helping was high, however, the experiment
seemed to confirm the aversive arousal reduction model,
rather than the empathy-altruism model. 425 That is, when the
cost of helping became too high, the motivational patterns
tended to be egoistic rather than altruistic. 426 Batson concluded that the "[riesults of this study ... suggest that any
altruistic motivation that blossoms from feeling empathy may
flower, easily crushed by overriding egoistic
be a fragile
427
concerns.
From a legal perspective, there are two ways to view the
conclusions of this "fragile flower" experiment. Under the first
view, law should not impose a duty to act when the costs of
acting are high, because empathically motivated individuals
tend to act egoistically rather than altruistically under such
circumstances. When the costs of acting are high, it would be
inconsistent with psychological models of human behavior to
impose a duty. In situations where psychologically reasonable
people would not act, the law should not require action. This
view is consistent with the Minnesota, Vermont, and Rhode
Island statutes that impose only a duty of easy rescue,42 8 and
is also consistent with those legal scholars who have called for
only a duty of easy rescue.42 9

421. Id.
422. See supra notes 399-405 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 399-405 and accompanying text.
424. BATSON, supra note 243, at 126-27.
425. Id. at 125-26.
426. Id. at 126.
427. Id. at 125-26. The "overriding egoistic concerns" were the higher costs of
helping-in the experiment, pain from a shock. Id. at 124.
428. See supra notes 147-49.
429. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, under a deterrence-oriented view of law, it is
arguable that legal rules might be most effective when the
costs of helping are high and the motivation to help is egoistic.
If the applicable legal rule imposes punishment or liability,
and if punishment-avoidance or guilt-avoidance is a partial
motivation for behavior, then laws may be most necessary, or
effective, when motivations are egoistic.4 3 ° Indeed, violating a
rule that imposes a duty to act would distress docile individuals more than any others.4 3 ' Under this view, a duty to
act may be unnecessary when the costs of helping are low, as
empathy may trigger action without a legal duty. However,
when empathy may not be expected to trigger action, such as
when the costs of rescue are high, a legal duty to act may be
the most effective way to encourage action.4 32 My own view is
that law works best when it follows indicated psychological
tendencies, not when it tries to counteract them. Thus, where
the costs of rescue are high, I would contend that the "fragile
flower" experiment indicates that not acting would be
reasonable and therefore that the non-actor should not be
subject to tort liability.
(b) PunishmentAvoidance-Batson also studied the contention that acting when one feels empathy is governed by an
empathy-specific punishment avoidance model.4 33 Proponents
of this model contend that the tendency to help is greater when
a person feels empathy because the helper knows that additional punishments in the form of guilt, shame, and censure
follow inaction.4 3 4 There are two versions of the theory. The
first postulates that one feeling empathy acts because of the
concern or fear of additional socially administered punishments. 43" The second suggests that one feeling empathy helps
because of the fear of additional self-inflicted, though socially
learned, punishments.43 6 Under either scenario, the desire to
help is motivated by egoistic concerns because the motivation
is primarily to avoid punishment.4 3 v Here, one notes the

430. The same statement could be made concerning rewards if people act in the
hope of receiving a reward.
431. See supra Part III.A.4.
432. At some point, presumably, one could argue that the risk to the actor would
be so great that action should not be required.
433. BATSON, supra note 243, at 128-48.
434. Id. at 128-29.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 134.
437. See id. at 97-98.

WINTER 1994]

Aiding and Altruism

relationship to path one. This theory of the relationship between
empathy, punishment, and action shoots the empathically
aroused individual from path three up to path one.438
Batson found little or no justification for an empathy-specific
punishment model. Instead, his experiments once again
confirmed the empathy-altruism model. 43 9 High empathy
individuals acted altruistically, not egoistically. The experiments did reveal, however, that low empathy individuals often
helped out of a desire to avoid punishment.4 4 °
The results of the experiments testing the empathy-specific
punishment model also present some interesting ramifications
for the law. Currently, tort law requires action when there 44is1
a special relationship between the bystander and the victim.
Thus, the law imposes a duty to act in situations where a
reasonable person experiences high levels of empathy and is
motivated to help by altruistic reasons. Where there is low
empathy, the experiments indicate that helping may be
coerced, in part, by an egoistic concern or a desire to avoid
punishment.4 4 2 In such a case, psychologists might contend
that a law which imposes punishment or liability on a lowempathy individual for failing to act would have a positive
effect on rescue.
Certainly, a law imposing liability on a high-empathy individual as well would do no harm. It would, as noted, be
consistent with what psychologists expect the high-empathy
actor to do anyway.4 43 The psychologically reasonable person
experiencing high empathy would and should act; the failure
to do so would be unreasonable, and therefore negligent,
conduct. Interestingly, when the costs of helping were high,
the experiments indicated that even the high-empathy actors'
motivation to help were egoistic. 444 Accordingly, a legal duty to
act might even be appropriate for high-empathy individuals
when the costs of action are high. In this regard, current
special relationship rules between rescuer and victim may be
psychologically appropriate because they provide an incentive
for egoistically motivated action.

438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 147-48.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra note 440 and accompanying text.
See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
BATSON, supra note 243, at 125-26.
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(c) Empathy-Specific Rewards Model-Finally, Batson
considered psychological models that contend that the relationship between empathy and helping is related to empathyspecific rewards.44 5 Proponents of these models explain the
empathy-helping relationship by claiming that when the
helper empathizes with the person in need, the anticipation of
social or self-rewards egoistically triggers aiding action.4 4 6
There are two different versions of the empathy-specific
rewards model of helping behavior. The first provides that we
learn through our society that additional rewards, such as
social praise or pride, follow helping one for whom we feel
empathy.4 4 7 The second version states that the "need for the
reward of helping, not the reward itself, is empathy specific."4 4 That is, we need to alleviate the "negative affective
state"449 that empathy brings on. In such a case, empathy
would lead to an egoistic desire to help. Based on a series of
studies, Batson concluded that the empathy-specific rewards
model was probably wrong, 450 but that the evidence was "not
as overwhelming or clear as evidence against the aversivearousal reduction and empathy-specific punishment hypotheses." 45 1 Nevertheless, if a relationship exists between empathy
and specific rewards, laws might be crafted so that individuals
who rescue could be specifically rewarded.
5. Batson's General Conclusions, Altruistic Personalities,
and Mysticism-Professor Batson concludes that the motivation behind empathically induced helping is altruistic.4 5 2
Although an individual whose motivation to help is altruistic
might also experience some incidental benefit from helping,
the motivation to help another truly is altruistic. While some
theorists have argued that there exists an altruistic personality type, 4 53 Batson has concluded that there is not
sufficient evidence to justify the belief that people who help

445. Id. at 149-74.
446. Id. at 149.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 163 (emphasis omitted).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 173.
451. Id. at 174.
452. Id.
453. See id. at 177-200; see also Hans W. Bierhoff et al., Evidence for the Altruistic Personality from Data on Accident Research, 59 J. PERSONALITY 263 (1991);
Gustavo Carlo et al., The Altruistic Personality:In What Contexts Is It Apparent?, 61
J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 450 (1991).
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others are altruistic by virtue of their personality type; further
research is needed.45 4
While Batson does note that several of the identified altruistic personality variables are associated with increased
helping, he also notes that the motivation behind helping
associated with most of those variables is egoistic, not altruistic. 455 Batson apparently believes that high-empathy individuals help others not because of their personality type and
not because they are afraid of punishment, seeking reward, or
seeking to abate unpleasant feelings. Rather, they help out of
an altruistic motive triggered by their empathy for another in
need.
Professor Thrasher, one critic of Batson's work, has stated
that to understand altruistic actions one might consider the
east and the various mystical experiences in which ego breaks
down and actor and rescued become, in essence, one. 456 This is
a psychological analogue of Schopenhauer's philosophical
explanation of rescue. 45 7 As noted, Batson rejects the ego
breakdown explanation. However, even if there is a mystical
explanation for rescue, one wonders how the law could help
induce this mystical response, other than by expressly
recognizing the role compassion plays in human experience.
6. Batson and Legal Rules-If people act because they fear
punishment or liability, the law has a rather traditional role
to play. A law threatening punishment or liability would
induce action. Alternatively, if people act because they seek
specific rewards, society might set up a legal regime that
rewards rescue.4 58
Even under Batson's empathy-altruism model, there are
situations in which, although people are partially motivated by
altruism, egoistic motives predominate. In these situations, a
law providing a duty to act with an accompanying sanction,
liability, or reward could play a key role to the extent society

454. BATSON, supra note 243, at 199.
455. Id. at 200-01. Interestingly, docility was not included among Batson's variables.
456. Thrasher, supra note 376.
457. See supra Part II.B.4.
458. For example, in admiralty, salvors are entitled to a reward, or bonus, when
they rescue maritime property. See Jo D. LUCAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 703-61 (3d ed. 1987). Interestingly, pure life salvors go uncompensated, id. at
749-51. Thus there is no reward for saving mere life as opposed to saving solely
property. An additional allowance, however, can be made for saving life in addition
to property.
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takes deterrence seriously. If, as Batson suggests, people act
egoistically when the costs of rescue are high, a rule imposing
a duty to act may be most important under those very circumstances.
More broadly, perhaps the most important thing about
Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis which concerns the
legal duty to act is its recognition that people at least occasionally act to benefit others. This realization requires us to
reexamine many of our current laws. It forces us to consider
that laws based solely upon the psychological model that
people act only to help themselves are not universally appropriate. Batson's work encourages us to recognize that we
can expect more from people, that under certain circumstances
a reasonable person may act to benefit another, despite
hazards or costs.
Batson's hypothesis increases greatly the potential scope of
legal action. At the least, it shows that the general rule imposing no duty to act is inconsistent with all of the psychological evidence, and paves the way for the imposition of a partial
duty to act. Psychology tells us that we can expect more from
people than the law currently requires. We must wonder
whether there is some good reason for the law to ignore what
psychology tells us about when, how, and why people act.
Throughout this Part, I have relied on psychological evidence to inform the reasonable person standard of negligence
law. It is appropriate to consider relevant psychological data
when deciding whether conduct is reasonable. We have long
considered the common sense of the community by defining
the standard of care for negligence in reference to the reasonable person.4 59 More recently, courts have expressly defined
reasonable conduct in light of the costs and benefits associated
with various actions.4 6 ° We must also consider our psychological capabilities.
Courts, when deciding whether to impose a duty to act,
should consider the extent to which a bystander felt empathy
for the victim. The higher the empathy, the more reasonable
to require rescue and attach liability for not rescuing,
especially if the costs of rescue are low. Therefore, Batson's
psychological evidence counsels that among the relevant
459. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 55, at 151-52.
460. See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947) (setting forth Judge Learned Hand's negligence formula B<PL, where
B=burden, P=probability, and L=injury).
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factors in asserting a duty to act are the amount of empathy
experienced and the costs of rescue. In a low-risk case, a highempathy actor is psychologically expected to act altruistically.
In such a case, compassionate action is the norm, and tort law
should institutionalize that norm.
Considering the psychological evidence broadens our traditional conception of reasonable conduct. American law generally has followed a Freudian bent in duty to act cases by
holding that because people act primarily out of self-interest
it is unreasonable to require them to act for another.4"' In a
cost-benefit, self-interested world, the rule imposing no general duty to act is consistent with the reasonable person
standard. Incorporating Batson's evidence into the formula,
however, may encourage society to reconsider. If reasonable
people do act altruistically in certain circumstances, we must
broaden our view of when tort law should require action.
The results of Batson's experiments on empathy and altruism are not inconsistent with feminist scholarship on tort
law. 4 2 Batson's data suggests that many of the characteristics
that feminist scholars urge courts to consider when rendering
their decisions, like empathy, do determine significant helping
behavior by both men and women.4 63
From a policy perspective, Batson's empathy-altruism
hypothesis has even broader implications. People who experience high empathy do, in fact, help more often than others.46 4 Thus, the law might generally attempt to increase
feelings of empathy. If feelings of attachment increase empathy, and empathy increases helping, laws could be designed to
increase the amount of empathy we feel for others. The
greater the empathy, the more altruistically motivated helping
one could expect. Thus, if helping is desirable, perhaps legal
rules should focus not on the moment help is needed, but
instead on the more general pre-emergency setting, in order to

461. See supra notes 355-57, and accompanying text.
462. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,
Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J. 848 (arguing that tort
litigation should focus more on health and safety and less on economic efficiency);
Martha Chamallas & Linda K Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright:A
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990) (urging courts to de-gender the tort of emotional
harm).
463. BATSON, supra note 243, at 192-98.
464. See supra note 388 and studies cited therein.
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foster the empathy that would trigger action at the later time
of the emergency.4 6 5
In the next section I turn to several frequently cited theorists on the no-duty-to-act rule. I analyze them primarily in
light of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, although I also note
some relevant points raised by Latan6 and Darley's work.

IV. COMMENTATORS, PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, AND A MODEST

PROPOSAL
A. Ames

In 1908 Dean Ames proposed the following rule:
One who fails to interfere to save another from impending
death or great bodily harm, when he might do so with
little or no inconvenience to himself, and the death or
great bodily harm follows as a consequence of his inaction,
shall be punished criminally and shall make compensation
to the party injured or to his widow and children in case of
466
death.
As we have seen, Ames's rule is consistent with the psychological evidence. Its duty of easy rescue conforms with Batson's
"fragile flower" experiment, which showed that altruistically
motivated helping is unlikely when the costs of action are
high.461 Thus, if laws are designed merely to recognize truths,
including psychological truths, Ames's rule would be consistent
with the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Arguably, a legal rule
would be most unnecessary in the easy rescue context, and most
effective at deterrence, when the actor's primary motivation is
of an egoistic nature. In that case, Ames's limited rule would
be backwards.

465. Moreover, if people act altruistically to help, one must consider the extent
to which people might, in fact, over-rescue. In that light, rescue actually may be, as
Batson notes, "harmful to your health." BATSON, supra note 243, at 212.
466. James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 113 (1908).
467. See supra Part III.D.4.
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B. Epstein

In his theory of strict liability based on principles of causation, Professor Epstein defends the no-duty-to-act rule in the
good Samaritan case.46 8 To oversimplify Epstein's theory of strict
liability, one is liable, irrespective of traditional notions of fault,
when he causes another to suffer injury. To cause an injury,
some volitional act is required. Epstein explains and defends
the current no-duty-to-act rule on the principle that the
defendant non-actor has not caused the plaintiff any injury.46 9
Professor Epstein criticizes those legal moral philosophers
like Ames who have called for a duty of easy rescue, arguing
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to place principled limits
on such easy rescue rules. 47" Accordingly, Epstein argues that
if law requires forced exchanges via required rescues, it "will
no longer be possible to delineate the sphere of activities in
which contracts (or charity) will be required in order to
procure desired benefits and the sphere of activity in which
those benefits can be procured as of right."4 7 ' Further, he
argues that the traditional rule tends to find the middle line
between moral theories emphasizing the importance of free
will and those concerning the external effects of individual
behavior, rather than motivation. 47 2 Although the "common
law position on the good Samaritan question does not appeal
to our highest sense of benevolence and charity," 47 3 Epstein
thinks our current general rule is sensible.
At the conclusion of his defense of the traditional good
Samaritan rule, Professor Epstein states his conception of the
general purposes of tort law:
[Ilt is better to see the law of torts in terms of what might
be called its political function. The arguments made here
suggest that the first task of the law of torts is to define
the boundaries of individual liberty. To this question the
rules of strict liability, based upon the twin notions of

468. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 51-68.
469. Id. at 51-52. Epstein excludes from his discussion cases in which the plaintiff
and defendant share some special relationship. Id. at 51 n.1.
470. Id. at 60-63.
471. Id. at 63.
472. Id. at 64-65.
473. Id. at 60.
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causation and volition, provide a better answer than the
alternative theories based upon the notion of negligence,
whether explicated in moral or economic terms. In effect,
the principles of strict liability say that the liberty of one
person ends when he causes harm to another. Until that
point he is free to act as he chooses, and need not take into
account the welfare of others.47 4
Epstein prizes individual liberty, the freedom of an individual
to act as she wishes, for oneself or another. Indeed, "[elven
those who argue ... that the law is utilitarian must in the
end find some special place for the claims of egoism which are
an inseparable byproduct of the belief that individual
autonomy-individual liberty-is a good in itself
not ex4 75
plainable in terms of its purported social worth."
Certainly this may be true, but it assumes that people act
out of self-interest. Although one might argue that individual
liberty and altruism are consistent because an individual has
the liberty to act altruistically, I associate the word "liberty"
not with altruism, but with the right to act as one chooses for
one's self within certain broad limits. Thus, Epstein's libertarian defense of the no-duty-to-act rule is somewhat inconsistent with Batson's confirmation of the empathy-altruism
hypothesis. Batson recognizes the psychological relationship
between our highest senses of benevolence and charity, and
our willingness to act on behalf of others.
Justification of a legal rule by largely egoistic concerns may
contradict the psychological evidence Batson has disclosed. Put
differently, liberty may or may not be considered a sufficient
justification for a legal rule that contradicts the psychological
evidence concerning human tendencies and motivations. If
liberty is based, in part, on selfishness, it is somewhat odd to
say that people are expected to act altruistically under certain
circumstances but that the law says they need not because
people have a right to act selfishly.
Epstein's theories recognize the value of individual, egoistically motivated action. But liberty is not an absolute. Other
values swirl in the mix. The major thrust of Part II, which
discussed myth and literature, was to point out the crosscultural recognition and praise of compassionate behavior. A

474.
475.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 61.
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legal rule defended for its reinforcement of individual liberty
fails to recognize that we exist in a world where interdependence is as real a condition as individual isolation.

C. Weinrib
Although he has since recanted, 47 6 Professor Weinrib initially found support in moral philosophy for a tort law duty of
easy rescue similar to Ames' duty.4 77 Weinrib accepts "the
intuition that failure to effect an easy rescue [is] morally
reprehensible. 4 78 He therefore argues that Epstein's defense
of the no-duty-to-rescue rule contradicts Epstein's claim that
he is going to develop a "normative theory corresponding to
common-sense morality."479 After dealing with several of
Epstein's other arguments, Weinrib turns to Epstein's argument that "confining the duty to rescue to situations of emergency and lack of inconvenience would not be feasible."4"'
While noting Epstein's underlying concerns for individual
liberty, Weinrib feels that Epstein's most challenging argument relates to the feasibility of a duty of easy rescue.4 8 '
For Epstein, as for Kant and Godwin, freedom is a central
value; indeed, he [Epstein] believes that "the first task of
the law of torts is to define the boundaries of individual
liberty." If the proposed duty is admitted, he argues, no
principled basis could be found to prevent unacceptable
infringements of individual liberty. Charitable contributions in amounts dependent on the donor's wealth would
be compulsory if it were substantially certain that without
them someone would die. Moreover, because the inconvenience to the reluctant rescuer could be eliminated by
the victim's offer of objectively suitable reimbursement, the
rescuer would find himself coerced to exchange the means

476. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a KantianIdea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
472, 501-03 (1987). Professor Heyman critiques Professor Weinrib's current views on
formalism in general, and on rescue in particular, in Heyman, supra note 157, at
710-37.
477. See Weinrib, supra note 27, at 279-92.
478. Id. at 279.
479. Id. at 259-60.
480. Id. at 267.
481. Id. at 268.
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of salvation for compensation. Once such forced exchanges
are required, says Epstein, there will be no way to distinguish liberty from obligation or contract from tort.4 82
Weinrib responds to Epstein's argument by noting that in
emergency situations, contract values are usually not at
stake. 4 3 Thus, he postulates that a duty of easy rescue in
emergency situations would be imposed only when "values of
contractual liberty are absent."48 4 Weinrib points out that such
a legal rule of easy rescue would "correspond to existing
restrictions on the power to contract," 4 85 and consequently
would not consume contract law.
Importantly, Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis does not
distinguish between situations in which one acts altruistically
in an emergency and in which one acts altruistically by
engaging in beneficence, such as donating to charity. To the
extent that one looks at the legal implications of Batson's
empathy-altruism hypothesis, one might respect Epstein's
objection that it is difficult to distinguish between beneficence
and rescue. In this regard, Weinrib's limitation of the duty of
easy rescue to emergency situations-where contract values
are not implicated-makes some sense. One may go further,
however, and question why beneficence might not be required
if reasonable people would act beneficently under the circumstances.4 8 6
Another objection to a tort duty to act has been that the
sheer number of potential defendants would make the rule
unworkable. Imagine a child drowning while a crowd looked
on from a crowded beach without acting. How can the law
single out one bystander to hold liable? The empathy-altruism
hypothesis provides no response to this objection. Where there
are several bystanders, Latan6 and Darley's evidence on
limited action in the company of others handles the feasibility
objections of Epstein concerning inaction. Psychologists would
not expect action in the company of strangers, so it arguably
would be inappropriate to impose a legal duty to act on any
one among many bystanders. A duty could be imposed,

482. Id. at 267.
483. Id. at 268-72.
484. Id. at 270.
485. Id. at 279.
486. I presently make no such claim, although I note that taxation to fund various
social programs is a form of universally imposed, forced beneficence.
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however, if the bystanders or the victim had some relationship
to the rescuer, or if the bystanders themselves were somehow
related.
Weinrib also examined the philosophical foundations for a
duty of easy rescue. 4 7 He first focused on Jeremy Bentham's
utilitarian justifications, pointing out that limiting the duty to
rescue to emergency situations in which rescue was convenient
would limit the duty of rescue along utilitarian lines and
would keep the duty out of the field of beneficence. 4 8" To
Weinrib, if each and every individual acted or was required to
act altruistically, we would all be "embrac[ing] a phantom. '4 9
He thus imposes a convenience limitation that plays an
important role in restricting the duty to rescue.
Of course, Batson's work, which finds that the empathyaltruism hypothesis is a "fragile flower,"49 ° implies that the
altruistic bases for rescue will not result in chasing phantoms.
People faced with high rescue costs will not act, at least not
out of altruistic motives. The costs of rescue will place
practical limits both on the duty to rescue and the number of
attempted rescues. 4 9 '

D. Landes, Posner, and Levmore
493

4 9 2 and Professor Levmore
Professors Landes and Posner
have examined the duty to rescue from an economic perspective and have made general recommendations regarding the
inducement of rescue through punishment or reward. If Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis holds true, rewards or
punishments would be most relevant in those situations in
which people were acting out of egoistic, rather than altruistic,
motivations.
All three authors have written that imposing a duty to act
might keep people away from certain recreational sites, such

487. Weinrib, supra note 27, at 279-92.
488. Id. at 280-81.
489. Id. at 282.
490. See supra notes 424-27 and accompanying text.
491. Weinrib's phantom objection is more persuasive as an objection to
Schopenhauer's view of "mystical" rescue, but even then the objection is limited.
Mystical states are transient. I know of no societies paralyzed by mystical activity.
492. Landes & Posner, supra note 52.
493. Levmore, supra note 14.
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as crowded beaches. If people in crowds usually do not act,
however, Latan6 and Darley's work would support a legal duty
to act only if the victim was a relative or friend, the bystander
was surrounded by relatives or friends, or the beach was a
familiar environment.4 9 4 If courts adopted a duty to rescue
with these limitations, I doubt that beaches would be empty.
Further, a concern for empty beaches somewhat trivializes the
capacity of one person to help another.

E. Heyman
In Foundationsof the Duty to Rescue,49 5 Professor Heyman
analyzed the legal duty to rescue in light of natural right and
social contract theories. Heyman concluded that one's responsibility to the community and her relationship to individual
members of the community can serve as the basis for a duty
to rescue.4 9 6 That duty would extend to a stranger; however,
only where action did not involve a "substantial risk of death
or serious bodily harm to the rescuer or to others."4 97 Breach
of the duty would be both a crime and a tort. Any resources
expended in the rescue effort would be "recoverable from the
community, through a mechanism established for that purpose.""' Heyman persuasively defends his proposal against
both formalist objections like those of Weinrib and libertarian
objections like those of Epstein. Although Heyman and I
approach the issue from different perspectives, our general
conclusions are similar.

494. See supra notes 343-54 and accompanying text.
495. Heyman, supra note 157.
496. Id. at 738-39.
497. Id. at 747-48. If a state intends to establish the duty with criminal sanctions,
and to set up a public fund to compensate rescuers for expenses, legislation is of
course required. Id. at 749. Moreover, because of several difficult situation-specific
issues, Heyman believes that legislation would be preferable. Id. In the absence of
positive legislation, courts could impose a tort duty of easy rescue. Id. at 750.
498. Id. at 748.
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Professor Bender has argued for the imposition of a duty to
act grounded in "a feminist ethic based upon notions of caring,
responsibility, interconnectedness, and cooperation." 499 Bender
emphasizes that a person in need of rescue is "a human being,
a part of us."5"0 The drowning person "is not detached from
everyone else ... He is interconnected with others."5 '
Bender's language is reminiscent of Schopenhauer's mystical
accounts of rescue.50 2 Bender states that if "we impose a duty
of acting responsibly with the same self-conscious care for the
safety of others that we would give our neighbors or people we
know, we require the actor to consider the human consequences of her failure to rescue."50 3 We would, in Batson's
terms, encourage empathy, which the empathy-altruism
hypothesis says leads to altruistic action. Bender calls for a
duty arising out of our interconnectedness with a "strong legal
value placed on care and concern for others rather than on
economic efficiency or individual liberty."50 4 Bender's arguments for a duty to rescue are based on the human ability to
behave compassionately. Her views generally are consistent
with Batson's conclusions and with the proposal I make in the
next subsection.
G. A Modest Proposal

Professor Leonard would base a duty of easy rescue upon a
multifactor analysis of foreseeability, ease of rescue, moral
blameworthiness, and other relevant factors.50 5 Like Professor
Leonard, I too would impose a duty to act using multiple
relevant factors for courts and juries to consider in particular
cases. In addition to the factors Leonard identifies and those

499. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 34 (1988).
500. Id.
501. Id. at 34-35.
502. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
503. Bender, supra note 499, at 35.
504. Id. at 36.
505. See Leonard, supra note 26, at 863-64.
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courts traditionally consider in such cases, I would implore
them to consider the factors found relevant by the psychological studies described above.
First, as a general matter, I would restate the rule. Current
law provides that there is no duty to act unless an exception
to the rule is triggered. I would reject this statement of the
rule in favor of a tort duty to help in an emergency 6 when
reasonable people would do so under similar circumstances.
This positive statement of the rule has several benefits. First,
it is consistent with the reasonable person standard traditionally applied in negligence cases. Reasonable care is what tort
law normally requires of an actor; the law should require
reasonable aid as well. A requirement of reasonable aid is
consistent with the psychological evidence that people do act
to help others out of a concern for others. Second, a positive
statement of the duty recognizes the value of helping acts and
our capacity to act compassionately. It recognizes a virtue
rather than a limit. Moreover, it reflects conflicting values,
individual liberty, and community action, rather than merely
individualism.
50 7
More specifically, what I propose is a multifactor tort duty
that would be flexibly applied in light of the relevant factors.
Any flexible standard raises concerns of uncertainty and
overdeterrence. I am willing to accept some of those risks in
light of the psychological evidence and the fact that my
proposal is consistent with the reasonable person standard
traditionally employed in negligence cases. I am sensitive,
however, to the concern that my flexible rule is not sufficiently
well-defined to justify the imposition of a criminal sanction.
Before setting the relevant factors, however, let me make a
procedural point about the allocation of decision-making
power. I would leave it to the court in the first instance, not
the jury, to decide if a reasonable person should have acted
under the circumstances. Only if reasonable minds could
conclude that a reasonable person would have acted, and that
the call to action otherwise would not affect adversely any

506. I have respected both Epstein and Weinrib's practicality arguments by
limiting the duty to emergency situations.
507. I have limited my proposal to a tort duty. Unlike Ames, I do not also propose
to impose a criminal sanction. See supra notes 466-67 and accompanying text. Unlike
Vermont, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, see supra notes 147-49, 152,
I have not proposed a criminal statute mandating rescue. But see D'Amato, supra
note 158, at 801-12 (proposing the imposition of a criminal sanction but no tort duty).
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relevant social policies would I counsel a court to submit the
case to the jury. 50 8 Now, let me consider the relevant factors.
A court, when deciding whether to impose a duty of
reasonable action in a particular case, should consider: (1) the
number of bystanders present; (2) the degree of attachment,
connection, or relationship between all the parties, including
the bystanders; (3) the costs of rescue, including potential risk
to the rescuer; (4) the degree of empathy that the defendant
nonrescuer felt or could reasonably be expected to feel for the
person who was not rescued; (5) the extent to which contract
values were implicated, or adversely affected, by imposing a
duty to rescue; and (6) the defendant's interest in doing what
he chooses. The first two factors are based in Latan6 and
Darley's work.5 °9 The third, cost of rescue, is derived from
Latan6 and Darley's model, Batson's experiments,5 0 and the
legal commentators described in this section. The empathy
factor is obviously based on Batson's work.5 1' The concern for
contract values is one I share with Professor Weinrib, while
the inclusion of the last factor, liberty, is an acknowledgment
that liberty is a good, but only one good among many. It
should be a factor, not an absolute. Along with liberty, we
value compassion, and the law must recognize that fact, lest
concern for individual autonomy and empty beaches isolates
us not just from one another but from a part of ourselves as
well.

CONCLUSION

The law traditionally has provided that there is no duty to
aid or rescue. This rule is consistent with a psychological
model of egoistic motivations, and a model of individual behavior under which each person is free to act as she chooses
and under which individual decisions made out of self-interest
supposedly lead to the greatest good for the greatest number.
This no-duty-to-act rule has been criticized, however, not only

508. For my view of the allocation of decision-making authority in tort cases
generally, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.,A Primeron the Patternsof Negligence, 53 LA.
L. REV. 1509 (1993).
509. See supra Part III.B.2.
510. See supra Part III.D.4.
511. See supra Part III.D.3.
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by legal scholars but also by the world's religions and artists.
Philosophers like Schopenhauer have called for action under
certain circumstances.
In light of this conflict between law and values, and in light
of the psychological evidence, one justifiably may conclude that
the current rule is inappropriate. By considering what
psychology has to say about the way in which the mind
actually works, we may develop new insight into developing
appropriate legal rules. It is in this vein that I have undertaken extensive discussions of the work of Latan6 and Darley,
and Batson. Their work has ramifications for our legal
conceptions of when and how courts ought to impose a duty to
act. In some regards, the psychological literature is consistent
with current legal rules. In other instances, however, the
psychological evidence tends to support the conclusion that the
law should be more demanding.
Based on that evidence I have argued that the law should
impose a tort duty, in an emergency, to act to help when
reasonable people would do so. The impetus for my proposal
comes, in part, from a personal commitment to our capacity,
as well as our need, for compassion. Batson's confirmation of
the empathy-altruism hypothesis provides support for the
notion that reasonable people do act to help others.
In the end, however, I must confess some uncertainty. I have
been educated in a world where egoism was assumed to be the
basic motivating force in human behavior. Batson's work
raises doubt; however, I cannot abandon the traditional behavioral model so easily. Ultimately, I am left thinking of
egoism and altruism as one of the world's many "mutually
supplementary antagonisms [like]: male-and-female, age-andyouth, life-and-death, love-and-hate; these, by their attraction,
conflicts, and repulsions, supply polar energies that spin the
universe."5 1 2 Adding egoism and altruism to the list, it does
not seem unreasonable that law, in shaping its rules, at least
ought to consider both. It is the express consideration of
altruism, as a prevalent motivation for action, that requires an
adjustment of our traditional image of tort law.
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